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INTRODUCTION

One day in 1994 leasehold investment and financing ended.
As if someone turned off a faucet, lenders stopped making
leasehold mortgage loans, and investments in leasehold estates
ceased. The reason? A few lower court decisions found that the
language of § 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code,1 carefully drafted to
protect the tenant when the lease is rejected in the landlord's
bankruptcy, protected only the tenant's right to remain in
possession for the balance of the term, and would not protect

1. The Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (2000), [hereinafter the
Code]. Any reference herein to a section of the law, without more, is to a
section of the Bankruptcy Code. The "carefully drafted" provisions of § 365(h)
prior to the troublesome cases were found in the 1984 Amendments and
discussed in Part I.B. of this Article.
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tenants not in possession, such as holders of ground leases, or
2
This
tenant's rights under covenants contained in 'the lease.
the
notwithstanding
flight from leasehold investments occurred
of
language
the
of
fact that any reasonable analysis and study
decided.
incorrectly
§ 365(h) would show that these cases were 3
There were also cases that went the other way.
In response to the crisis thus created, Jack Marino, then of
4
Chicago Title and Trust Co., put together a group of people
representing landlords, tenants, lenders, borrowers, and trade
groups to hammer out a suggested amendment to the Bankruptcy
5
Code to correct the problem. Bankruptcy legislation was pending
in Congress at the time, and faced with the clout of a group
representing all sides of leasehold investment, Congress
responded, 6 and leasehold investments began again.
This crisis in leasehold financing is recounted to illustrate two
things. First, that leasehold investments, and especially leasehold
mortgages, are very fragile. Any hint that the security for the loan
may be terminated or modified if a landlord, not a party to the
loan, files in bankruptcy, can send out shock waves. Second, that
crisis illustrates that the consequences of this fragility can be
overcome by determined efforts in Congress.
This is important because the recent Seventh Circuit decision
7
in Precision Industries, Inc. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ has the
potential again to completely disrupt leasehold investments, and
has already caused great concern in the real estate investment
community.8 And well it should. For Qualitech held, in essence,
2. See Case Discussion infra Part I.C.
3. Id.
4. Mr. Marino is presently Executive Vice President of Ticor Title
Insurance Company in New York.
5. This informal committee will be referred to herein as the "Marino
Committee."
6. See discussion of the 1994 amendments infra Part I.C.
7. 327 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2003).
8. See, e.g., Christopher C. Genovese, Precision Industries v. Qualitech
Steel: Easing the Tension Between Sections 363 and 365 of the Bankruptcy
Code?, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 627, 649 (2004) (concluding that "lessees
must remain vigilant when their lessors file for bankruptcy or risk losing their
leasehold interest to a sale free and clear"); Michael St. Patrick Baxter,
Section 363 Sales Free and Clearof Interests: Why the Seventh Circuit Erred in
Precision Industries v. Qualitech Steel, 59 Bus. LAW. 475 (2004) (stating case
"will have profound implications not only on bankruptcy sales but on real
estate leasing and real estate lease financing"); John C. Murray, Precision
Industries: Debtor-Lessor's Property May Be Sold "Free and Clear" of
Unexpired Lease, 18 PROB. & PROP. 10, 16 (Mar./Apr. 2004) (stating Precision
Industriesdecision sent "shockwaves" throughout the real estate industry and
could prove "potentially devastating"-although he found significant
protection for the lessee under § 363); Jerald I. Ancel et al., Can a § 363 Sale
Dispossess a Tenant Notwithstanding § 365(h)?, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 18, 31
(2003) (finding Qualitech "leaves unanswered the ... interesting and far-
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that a landlord in bankruptcy could ignore the complex provisions
of § 365(h), designed and carefully nurtured over the years, to
protect the tenant when the landlord is in bankruptcy by selling
its fee interest free and clear of the lease under § 363. Suddenly all
the protection for the tenant when a lease is rejected 9 in a
landlord's bankruptcy became subject to question. What makes
matters worse is that application of the normal rules of statutory
interpretation seems to indicate that Qualitech was correctly
decided.1° Thus it is likely to be followed by other courts. The
Qualitech result, however, certainly was not contemplated or
intended at the time the Bankruptcy Code was drafted."1
In addition to the problems created by the case itself, the
decision in Qualitech had a ripple effect in many areas, including
the possible application of the principles enunciated in the case to
situations where the tenant, rather than the landlord, is in
bankruptcy, and attempts to sell the lease under § 363 under
circumstances where an assignment would not be permitted under
§ 365, a result that could thoroughly disrupt shopping center
investments.12
This Article is not intended as support, for or a criticism of
the Qualitech decision. Nor is it intended to predict whether the
problems and risks resulting from the decision may or may not
ultimately be resolved by the courts. The purpose of this Article is

reaching question of what happens when lessees.., request adequate
protection [after the property is ordered sold free and clear of lease]"); Peter N.
Tamposi, Tenants Beware-Your Lease Rights May Be Subject to Termination
by the Bankruptcy Court-Licensees of Intellectual Property Take Note: You
May Be Next, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 30, 30 (2003) (finding that Qualitech
"raises significant concerns for licensees of patent rights"
whose protection
under § 365(n) may be overcome by sale free and clear under § 363(f)). As an
illustration of the concern in the real estate community, the highly respected
editor of the on-line real property lawyer's listserv "Dirt", Professor Patrick A
Randolph, Jr., had this to say: "[Qualitech] is a bombshell on the order of
magnitude of Durrett and Fleet Factors, and interested parties should seek to
muster support for a petition for en banc rehearing and, if necessary, a
Supreme Court appeal. It puts virtually all long term leases and leasehold
mortgages in mortal danger when the landlord files for bankruptcy." Posting
of Patrick A. Randolph, randolphp@umkc.edu, to dirt@umkc.edu (Apr. 29,
2003) (on file with author).
9. Section 365(a) authorizes the trustee, subject to the court's approval, to
assume or reject executory contracts and unexpired leases of the debtor. In
Chapter 11, § 1107(a) provides that a debtor in possession, with certain
limitations, has all of the rights (other than compensation) and powers of a
trustee.
10. Baxter, supra note 8,adamantly takes the opposite position, claiming
that the Seventh Circuit was clearly wrong in its determination. His views
will be discussed in the material below.
11. The Code was signed into law by President Carter on November 6,
1978. See infra note 38.
12. See Part III of this Article, infra.
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to point out that the problems and risks involved in the
application of § 363, exposed to us by the Qualitech decision, are
severe enough to result in serious problems for the future of
leasehold financing and investment unless they are resolved now.
Qualitech, in a sense, serves as a wake-up call. It is a call that
makes it incumbent on those interested in preserving real estate
leasehold investments to revive a 1994-type coalition and urge
Congress to address the complications resulting from the
Qualitech decision with appropriate legislation before we are again
faced with a flight from leasehold investment. Indeed, this may be
the opportune time to accomplish such a correction since, like
1994, Congress is, at the writing, again considering legislation to
amend the Bankruptcy Code. 13
Part I of this Article will discuss some of the background to
the drafting and subsequent development of § 365, showing
congressional intention to afford protection to the tenant when the
landlord is in bankruptcy. Part II will discuss the Qualitech
decision, why it is believed it was correctly decided at least from a
technical standpoint, the protections available under § 363 for the
lessee and interests in the lease, and the uncertainties involved in
applying those protections. Part III will discuss the development
of provisions in § 365 designed to protect the landlord's bargain
when the tenant is in bankruptcy. It will then apply the principles
enunciated in Qualitech in the context of a situation where the
tenant is in bankruptcy and proposes to sell the lease under § 363
to someone who would not pass muster as an assignee under
§ 365. Finally, the Article will discuss the questionable protection
available to the landlord under such circumstances.
Throughout the Article, drafting and other practice
suggestions will be recommended to mitigate some of the
difficulties presented by the holding in Qualitech and other

13. As part of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, discussed below in
connection with leaseholds, Congress established the National Bankruptcy
Review Commission ("Review Commission"). Bankruptcy Reform Commission
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4147. The recommendations found
in the Review Commission's Report, NAT'L BANKR. REV. COMM'N,
BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS, FINAL REPORT (1997), were fraught
with dissent and perhaps some obfuscation (see, e.g., Robert M. Zinman, New
Value and the Commission: How Bizarre!, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 477, 480
nn.12-13), and did not stand much chance of acceptance by Congress. Its
contribution was to raise awareness about the issues that needed to be
resolved. Reform legislation was introduced in 1998 but was stymied in
Congress over essentially non-bankruptcy issues, such as abortion, raised
through amendments proposed by critics of the legislation. The legislation has
been reintroduced in 2005. If the deal breaking amendments can be resolved,
it may be enacted in the very near future. If it is quickly enacted in the very
near future. If it is quickly enacted the task of obtaining further amendments
will be greatly exacerbated.
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problems associated with the protection afforded by § 365.14 These
suggestions, however, may reduce, but cannot eliminate, the risks
herein discussed. The conclusion reached is that an amendment to
the Bankruptcy Code is needed. Legislative language changes are
suggested in the Appendix to this Article.
I.

365 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND
THE LANDLORD'S BANKRUPTCY

SECTION

Section 365 deals with executory contracts and leases and
contains provisions designed to balance the interests of either the
landlord or tenant when the other is in bankruptcy. With respect
to tenant protection, § 365(h) makes it clear that rejection of the
lease on behalf of a landlord in bankruptcy cannot destroy the
estate conveyed by lease to a tenant, an estate that includes all
rights of the tenant under the lease that are appurtenant to the
leasehold estate. The drafting and subsequent modification and
strengthening of these protections whenever problems arose in
their interpretation over the last twenty-five years demonstrates
congressional dedication to insuring that those protections work.
Thus it is no surprise that real estate people were surprised - and
shocked - when the Seventh Circuit in Qualitech showed us that
notwithstanding § 365, there was another string to the debtor's
bow.
The first memorandum I was asked to write as a new, young
attorney at Metropolitan Life Insurance Company ("MetLife") in
1960, involved the effect of a bankrupt 15 landlord's rejection of a
lease on the tenant and others with interests in the lease, such as
leasehold mortgagees. At that time, the liquidation sections of the
Bankruptcy Act provided that rejection by the trustee of a
bankrupt landlord would not "deprive the tenant of his estate." 16
Whether this language was applicable in corporate reorganizations
(Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act) was a matter of conjecture.
Also unclear was which lease covenants were included in the
tenant's "estate." An article by Henry Allen Mark in the Business
Lawyer pointed out that at least one federal case held that renewal
rights were not part of a tenant's estate. 17 Since the New York
14. Each practice suggestion will be indented under a boldface heading
"Practice Comment."
15. This was when we still had the Bankruptcy Act and under that statute
those who were in bankruptcy were known as "bankrupts" rather than
"debtors." Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544. References herein to
this pre-Bankruptcy Code law will be to the "Bankruptcy Act."
16. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 70(b), 30 Stat. 544, 565-66 (codified
as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1976) (repealed 1978)).
17. See Henry Allen Mark, Leasehold Mortgages - Some Practical
Considerations, 14 Bus. LAw. 609, 611 (1959). The case was Coy v. Title
Guarantee & Trust Co., 198 F. 275 (D. Or. 1912).
This was an equity
receivership in which the receiver refused to honor the renewal provision. The
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Insurance Law at the time permitted life insurance companies to
make loans secured by leasehold estates only if the term of the
lease including enforceable options of renewal exceeded the term of
the mortgage by the requisite amount of time,18 the Mark article
sparked a lively and long discussion in a staff meeting. If a
landlord, by rejection in bankruptcy, could eliminate the option of
renewal, could the option nevertheless be construed as enforceable
within the meaning of the New York statute, and, if not, would all
existing leasehold mortgages relying on the renewal to comply
with the statute be improper? At the conclusion of the meeting the
newest and most vulnerable attorney was commissioned to
research the issue.
The resulting memorandum, which was written under the
supervision of and in consultation with John J. Creedon, then
Assistant General Counsel, and later President of MetLife,
concluded that there was need for amendment to the bankruptcy
law to deal with the problem of rejection of leases in general and
specifically to be certain that renewal rights would survive
rejection. The research and conclusion was aided immeasurably
by correspondence with Professor James Angell MacLachlan, who
had drafted the language of § 70(b) of the Bankruptcy Act,' 9 which
was designed to protect the tenant's estate on the rejection of its
court, stating that the receiver "is not bound by the covenants of leases and
executory contracts.., and ... may abandon or repudiate them if, in his
opinion, it would not be profitable or desirable to adopt and perform them" and
allowed the receiver to decline to renew the lease. Coy, 198 F. at 280.
18. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 81.6(a) (McKinney 1966), which permitted
insurance companies to make mortgage loans on "improved real property
located in the United States (including leasehold estates having an unexpired
term of not less than twenty-one years, inclusive of the term or terms which
may be provided by enforceable options of renewal." Id. The length of the
leasehold mortgage was restricted to a portion of the term of the lease as
follows:
No mortgage loan upon a leasehold shall be made or acquired by an
insurer pursuant to this paragraph unless the terms thereof shall
provide for such payments of principal, whatever the period of the loan,
that at no time during the period of the loan shall the aggregate
payments of principal theretofore required to be made under the terms
of the loan be less than would have been necessary for a loan payable
completely by the end of the lesser of a period of four-fifths of the period
of the leasehold, inclusive of the period or periods which may be
provided by enforceable options of renewal, which is unexpired at the
time the loan is made or thirty-five years, through payments of interest
only for five years and equal payments applicable first to interest and
then to principal at the end of each year thereafter.
Most of these qualitative limitations on life insurance company
Id.
investments were eliminated in the Recodification of the Insurance Law in
1984. See 1984 N.Y. LAWS ch. 367, and N.Y. INS. LAW § 1405 (McKinney
2003).
19. This language was inserted as part of a major overhaul of the 1898 Act
in 1938, the so-called Chandler Act.
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lease in the bankruptcy of the landlord. He generously shared his
drafting objectives with this author. 20 Almost ten years later, at a
time when the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States 2 1 was meeting to propose bankruptcy law revisions, Penn
Central
Transportation
Company
filed
for
bankruptcy
reorganization. 22 In Penn Central's bankruptcy, the railroad
attempted to reject the ground leases of the so-called "Park
Avenue Properties." Park Avenue in New York City was originally
an open cut in the ground 23 in which trains ran to Grand Central
Terminal from the north, turned around and returned north. 24
When the railroad covered over the tracks, it leased out portions of
those platforms over Park Avenue for the purpose of constructing
buildings. These "ground leases" 25 were what Penn Central was
20. The prohibition on depriving the tenant of its estate language
apparently stems from a suggestion Professor MacLachlan made in a 1927 law
review article that had proposed amendments to the Bankruptcy Act. He said
that "[tihe bankruptcy of a landlord, however, shall not work forfeiture of the
tenant's estate and shall give the landlord's trustee in bankruptcy no election
to terminate the estate." James Angell McLaughlin, Amendment of the
Bankruptcy Act, 40 HARV. L. REV. 583, 606 (1927). "Professor McLaughlin's
name was changed to MacLachlan by decree of the Probate Court of Middlesex
County, Massachusetts, January 21, 1948 'correcting an error made in
Scotland about 1835."' THE BANKRUPTCY ACT V n.5 (annotated by John
Hanna & James Angell MacLachlan, 6th ed. 1957). For greater detail on
interpretations and misinterpretations of Professor MacLachlan's language,
see John J. Creedon & Robert M. Zinman, Landlord's Bankruptcy: Laissez Les
Lessees, 26 BUS. LAW. 1391, 1400 n.39 (1971).
21. The nine-member Commission, chaired by Harold Marsh, Jr. with Prof.
Frank Kennedy serving as Executive Director, was formed to analyze and
recommend changes to the bankruptcy law. Act-of July 24, 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-354, 84 Stat. 468. Its report was submitted to Congress on July 30, 1973.
H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States will be referred to herein as the
"Commission." The Commission should not be confused with the National
Bankruptcy Review Commission, which was established as part of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994. See supra,note 13.
22. Penn Central filed in bankruptcy on June 20, 1970. See Robert E.
Bedingfield, Bankruptcy Anniversary, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1971, at Fl.
23. Robert E. Bedingfield, Pennsy Will Sell 23 Valuable Sites in MidManhattan,N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1971, at 1, 63.
24. This is why Grand Central is a "terminal" as distinguished from a
"station." Cf. Terminus, On the Origins of Property: The Myth of Terminus, 5
PROB. & PROP. 56 (Sep./Oct. 1991). This Article was delivered to Probate and
Propertyby the late Norman Geis of the firm Greenberger, Krauss and Jacobs
(Chicago), but Geis, former Chair of the Joint Editorial Board on the Uniform
Real Property Acts, maintained that "the true author was Terminus, the
ancient Roman god of boundaries and the patron saint of real estate lawyers."
Id. at 59.
25. By "ground lease" we refer to a lease of the entire property, generally a
net lease where the tenant may sublet to people who occupy the premises or to
others who sublease to people who occupy the premises. These ground leases
were separated from the fee by a "grant of term" to a subsidiary for priority
purposes. For a discussion of the grant of term as, effectively, a subordination,
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seeking to reject in its proposed plan of reorganization. 26 The
prospect of lease rejection, or even of rejection of the renewal and
rental provisions, 27 sent shivers through the real estate
community. As a result, John Creedon and I decided that it would
be appropriate to share the results of the 1960-61 research and our
intermittent study and thought over a ten year period by updating
see infra note 83. The ground lessees often sublet the entire premises under
an "operating lease" to a person who would lease space to people who actually
occupied the premises. Often the ground lease and operating lease where
separated by one or more layers of "sandwich leases." This structure was the
result of a lease layering leveraging technique conceived by William
Zeckendorf, Sr. while in Hawaii and known as his "Hawaiian Technique." See
WILLIAM ZECKENDORF, ZECKENDORF

144-48 (1970).

An example of this

technique is the Graybar building, which at the time of the Penn Central
Bankruptcy had the following lease structure: the land and building [the
"Premises"] was owned by the Penn Central Transportation Company.
Despatch Shops, Inc., a subsidiary of Penn Central, held a grant of term of the
Premises from Penn Central. Despatch leased the Premises to MetLife under
a net long-term ground lease. MetLife subleased the Premises to a syndicate
known as Graybar Building Associates under a net long-term sandwich lease.
Graybar Building Associates sub-subleased the Premises under another net
long term sandwich lease to a subsidiary of a Chicago based insurance
company, Precision Dynamics Corporation. Precision Dynamics sub-subsubleased the Premises to Harry Helmsley d/b/a Graybar Building Associates
under a net long-term "operating lease." Helmsley sub-sub-sub-subleased
space in the Premises to tenants under "occupancy leases." See Creedon &
Zinman, supra note 20; Motion for Clarification, Doc. No. 15219, 12
REORGANIZATION COURT PROCEEDINGS, THE PENN CENTRAL TRANSPORTATION

COMPANY, DEBTOR 8104, 1805 (CRR Publishing Co. 1981).
26. See Section 6, Amended Plan of Reorganization, Doc. No. 13289, June 2,
1977, 10 REORGANIZATION COURT PROCEEDINGS, THE PENN CENTRAL
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, DEBTOR, 7379, 7405 (CRR Publishing Co. 1981).

Most of the land along lower Park Avenue and surrounding Grand Central
Terminal, including such properties as the hotels Waldorf-Astoria, Barkley,
Commodore, and Roosevelt, 250 Park Avenue (the Marine Midland Building),
383-85 Madison Avenue (which had been the home office of William
Zeckendorfs Webb & Knapp), the Graybar Building, the Yale Club, and the
PanAm Building (now the MetLife Building) among others, was owned by the
railroad. The railroad received $21 million a year in ground rents from these
tenants (a lot of money in those days), but there was no question that the fixed
rents under these long term leases, entered into years before, were well below
market.
27. At the time, it was considered unlikely that Penn Central's objective
was to eliminate the leases. Rather it was thought that the object of rejection
was a renegotiation of the rental provisions. See Robert Metz, Market Place:
Ground Leases at Penn Central, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1971, at 44. Indeed,
prior to rejecting the leases in its Plan of Reorganization, the Trustees had
moved, inter alia, to reject the renewal terms of the Graybar Building lease at
416-444 Lexington Avenue, indicating that its appraisals showed the value of
the fee interest would jump from $6.9 million to $23.5 million if rental under
the ground leases were increased to market. 18 REORGANIZATION COURT
PROCEEDINGS, THE PENN CENTRAL TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, DEBTOR, Doc

No. 10651, May 27 1976, 1922, (CRR Publishing Co. 1981) (contains summary
only).
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and publishing the original memorandum. 28
A.

The Road to § 365(h)

The published article argued, inter alia, that because leases
represent a conveyance of an estate in land as well as a contract, a
tenant should be protected when the lease is rejected in the
landlord's bankruptcy, and urged the Commission and Congress to
correct the ambiguities in § 70(b) of the Bankruptcy Act in the
revisions being drafted. The article. proposed language that would
amend the section to provide that, without limiting the meaning of
the tenant's estate, no rejection by the landlord's trustee could
"affect any right of renewal or extension ... or increase the rental
or additional sums to be paid by the lessee pursuant to the terms
of the lease."

29

28. Creedon & Zinman, supra note 20, at 1391-92 introductory footnote.
The correspondence with Professor MacLachlan was appended to the article.
Id. at 1436-42. Judge Fullam, the District Judge in charge of the Penn
Central reorganization case, in his executory contracts decision in Penn
Central made reference to the article but said: "I prefer not to rely on the
authority of this article in the present case, because of the possibility that it
may have been written in anticipation of the present litigation." In re Penn
Cent. Transp. Co., 458 F. Supp. 1346, 1355 (E.D. Pa. 1978). While the article
may have been published in light of the threat to the Park Avenue Properties,
it had largely been written ten years before when Penn Central did not yet
exist and one of its predecessors, New York Central Railroad, was considered
the quintessential gilt-edge corporation. Other articles dealing with lease
rejection prior to the adoption of the Bankruptcy Code include Lee Silverstein,
Rejection of Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy and Reorganization,31 U. CHI.
L. REV. 467 (1964), A. Edward Gottesman, The Onus of Executory Contracts in
Bankruptcy: Focus on Vendors and Lessors, 4 PRAC. LAW. 65 (1958), and A.O.
Stanley, Jr., Leasehold Rights in Bankruptcy and Equity Proceedings, 29 KY.
L.J. 301 (1941). Also, while not dealing with leases in bankruptcy, see Vern
Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439
(1973), and Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part II, 58
MINN. L. REV. 479 (1974), where the current generally accepted definition of
"executory contract" is articulated.
29. Creedon & Zinman, supra note 20, at 1435-36. Other language
changes were also recommended to provide that the bankrupt landlord may
reject only executory contracts including leases that are burdensome in the
sense that the lease provides no economic benefit to the creditors, and that a
lease would not be considered executory if it did not involve performance in
the future by the debtor. Id. With respect to the "burdensome" issue, Judge
Fullam's Penn Centraldecision rejecting Penn Central's attempted rejection of
the leases of the Park Avenue Properties, did so on equitable grounds, noting
that "[tihere are no burdensome affirmative covenants." In re Penn Cent., 458
F. Supp. at 1356. In a footnote he stated, "I do not mean to suggest that the
power to disaffirm executory contracts is limited to those which are
burdensome. Although that theory has been earnestly pressed in this case,
the law is to the contrary: Group of Investors v. Chicago Milwaukee, St. Paul
& Pacific R.R., 318 U.S. 523 (1943)." Id. at 1356 n.13. The decision he cited
adopted the business judgment test of whether to reject a lease, but the case
involved a tenant's bankruptcy where the considerations involved in
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The Commission in its Report took a different tack. It
avoided dealing with the definition of the tenant's "estate" and,
instead, simply provided in § 4-602(c) of its proposed act, that the
"rejection by a trustee of a lessor would constitute the
abandonment of the leased property to the lessee and not a breach
of the lease." 30 While the Commission's proposal seemed like an
easy solution, it was not free of problems: one was conceptual (one
does not normally abandon property to someone 31 ), another was a
record issue (the provision did not provide for a deed or other
record evidence of transfer of title to the lessee), and also there
was an allocation issue (in multiple tenanted office buildings the
title would have to be allocated among a number of tenants).
When the Commission proposal was introduced in Congress
("Commission Bill"),32 the National Conference of Bankruptcy
Judges, primarily because of its opposition to the Commission
proposal for an administrative agency to take over much of the
judges' functions, introduced its own proposal ("Judges' Bill"),33
which took still another approach to the rejection issue. It
provided in its § 4-602(c) that rejection would give the lessee the
option to continue occupancy of the premises by paying the
stipulated lease rental. 34 The tenant could perform the landlord's
defaulted obligations, receiving a credit against the rent. 35 In
determining whether to retain a location are far more complex than whether a
lease is profitable (e.g. will the tenant be closing stores in that area of the
country). Group of Investors, 318 U.S. at 552-53. See also the Commission
note, infra quoted in note 30, implicating the burdensome concept.
30. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAws OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 2, § 4-602, § 4-602 (1973). The

Commission's Note 12 to this section read in part:
The new sentence obviates the need to distinguish between leased
covenants that are part of the 'estate' of the lease [sic] and those that
are not. As a result, the court is not invited to reform the lease
agreement entered by the parties. Instead the lessee's trustee, or the
debtor in possession, is called upon to compare the negative value of an
unprofitable lease with the remaining value of the leased property. If
the outcome shows a negative net value, he should abandon the leased
property to the lessee. Abandonment is not a breach of the lease,
however, and the lessee receiving the abandoned property is not
permitted a claim for loss of bargain.
Id.
31. Abandonment is normally considered a relinquishment or surrender of
rights in property, not a transfer of property to another party or with reference
to a particular purpose.
32. H.R. 31, 94th Cong. (1975); and S. 235, 94th Cong. (1975) [hereinafter
Commission Bill].
33. H.R. 32, 94th Cong. (1975); and S. 236, 94th Cong. (1975) [hereinafter
Judge's Bill].
34. Id.
35. H.R. 32 § 4-602(c). The proposed language read as follows:
The rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease constitutes a
breach of the contract or lease by the debtor as of the date of the
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testimony on behalf of the American Council of Life Insurance
("ACLI"),36 John J. Creedon, as Chair of the ACLI's Subcommittee
on Federal Bankruptcy Legislation, stated that the "abandonment
approach may prove to be unworkable" and that "on the whole the
Judges' approach is more satisfactory".37
As a result of the hearings, the House prepared a bill that
was a conglomeration of the Commission and Judges' drafts and
the Committee testimony, which was introduced as H.R. 6 and
later became H.R. 8200.38 It adopted the Judges' approach to lease

petition. However, the rejection of a lease under which the debtor is the
lessor shall give the lessee the option of continuing the occupancy of the
leased premises or possession of the leased property, as the case may be,
upon lessee's payment of the rentals stipulated by the lease agreement
to the successor to debtor's interest as lessor; lessee shall have the
further option of performing lessor's defaulted obligations at lessee's
costs and to receive offset credit for those costs against lessee's
stipulated renal payments.
Id.
36. Throughout this Article, the name of this life insurance trade
organization will be referred to as the "ACLI." The name, however, underwent
several changes in the early to mid-1970s. It was the Life Insurance
Association of America (after a merger with the American Life Convention in
1971) at the beginning of the drafting period and became the American Life
Insurance Association (and was so at the time of this testimony), finally
becoming the ACLI. Advisor Today, Voices From the Field: The NALU
Increases
Political
Activity,
http://www.advisortoday.com/currentmonth//OpenBook/vftf-nalu
increases.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2004). Today it is known as the American
Council of Life Insurers ("ACLI") and its website can be found at
www.acli.com. During the period of the drafting of the Bankruptcy Code, the
ACLI Subcommittee on Federal Bankruptcy Legislation was aided
immeasurably by the dedication of two members of the ACLI staff, John S.
Forsythe, Associate General Counsel, and Charles L. King, Assistant General
Counsel.
37. Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the
House Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1596-99 (1975) (testimony of John Creedon, Chairman
of the ACLI Subcommittee on Bankruptcy Legislation).
38. H.R. 6, 95th Cong. (1977). The bill went through several iterations as
the House and Senate fought over the status of the bankruptcy court system,
eventually becoming H.R. 8200, which was signed into law by President
Carter on November 6, 1978. For a fascinating blow-by-blow analysis of the
legislative intrigue, strategy and maneuvers that resulted in the adoption of
the Bankruptcy Code, see Kenneth N. Klee, Legislative History of the New
Bankruptcy Law, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 941 (1979). See also Kenneth N. Klee,
Legislative History of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 1979 ANN. SURV. OF
BANKR. L. 21 (1979). That volume also has articles on that Act by Professor
Frank Kennedy, Robert Feidler and Congressman Don Edwards. Much of the
credit for the adoption of the Code must go to the brilliant and dedicated
counsel to the subcommittees involved: on the House side, Richard Levin,
counsel to the Chairman of the subcommittee, Congressman Don Edwards,
and Kenneth N. Klee, counsel to the ranking minority subcommittee member,
Congressman M. Caldwell Butler, and, on the Senate side, Robert E. Feidler,
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rejections and, in § 365(h), granted an option to the tenant on the
landlord's rejection of the lease to remain in possession "for the
balance of the term of the lease."39 This phrase caused some
concern because it was not clear that the "term of the lease"
included options of renewal. 40 The result was the revision of the
draft of § 365(h) to include language protecting the tenant's rights
under the lease for the term of the lease and any options of
renewal enforceable by the tenant. As a result of the drafting
process, § 365(h) became a part of the Bankruptcy Code. Its
purpose was to resolve the ambiguities of § 70(b) of the
Bankruptcy Act. By placing § 365 in the article of the Code
dealing with case administration, it would be applicable, except as
might be specifically provided, to all the Chapters of the Code,
thus resolving the question under the Bankruptcy Act of whether
§ 70(b)'s protection of the tenant's estate applied in reorganization
proceedings. The language of the section was designed to flesh out
Professor MacLachlan's statement that the rejection by the
landlord does not deprive the tenant of its "estate" by providing in
practical terms what would happen on rejection. It gave the
tenant the option to treat the lease as terminated by the rejection,
or to remain in possession and deduct the cost of performing any of
the landlord's defaulted obligations from the rent. The section was
far shorter than the provision today. As enacted, it read as
follows:
1) If the trustee rejects an unexpired lease of real property of the
debtor under which the debtor is the lessor, the lessee under such
lease may treat the lease as terminated by such rejection, or, in the
alternative, may remain in possession for the balance of the term of
such lease and any renewal or extension of such term that is
enforceable by such lessee under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
(2) If such lessee remains in possession, such lessee may offset
against the rent reserved under such lease for the balance of the
term after the date of the rejection of such lease, and any such
renewal or extension, any damages occurring after such date caused
by the non-performance of any obligation of the debtor after such
date, but such lessee does not have any rights against the estate on
arising after such date from such rejection,
account of any damages
41
other than such offset.

counsel to Senator Dennis DeConcini, Chairman of the subcommittee, and
Harry D. Dixon, Jr., counsel to Senator Malcolm Wallop, ranking minority

member of the subcommittee.
39. H.R. 6, 95th Cong. (1977).
40. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearingon S. 2266 and H.R. 8200
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach. of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong. 860 (1977) (statement of John J. Creedon, Chairman of
the ACLI Subcommittee on Bankruptcy Legislation).
41. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2577.
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It should be emphasized that all the proposals and
suggestions for the redrafting of § 70(b) of the Bankruptcy Act
were aimed at protecting the tenant's rights under the lease.
There was no question as to what the law was or should be and
that its purpose was to protect the tenants and their leases. The
issue was how to articulate it so it would not be misconstrued. 42
While it had been hoped that the issue of protection of the
tenant in the landlord's bankruptcy had been put to rest with the
adoption of the Code in 1978, it was not to be the case. Two major
amendments-in 1984 and 1994-were required to carry out the
intent of the drafters with respect to the protection of the tenant's
estate. Each time a problem arose, Congress responded.
B. The 1984 Amendments
Half a year before the new Bankruptcy Code became effective,
a technical corrections amendment was introduced by Senator
DeConcini in the Senate and Congressman Don Edwards in the
House, the purpose of which, as found in its title, was to "correct
technical errors, clarify and make minor substantive changes" 43 to
a variety of provisions in the Bankruptcy Code. The proposed
legislation stalled over certain substantive and controversial
issues that arose while the amendments were being consideredthe establishment of constitutional bankruptcy courts and the
rejection of union contracts 4 4 -and did not become law until the
passage of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act in 1984. 4 5 This Act contained important amendments to
§ 365(h).
The real estate community, especially leasehold lenders, had
42. Protection for the tenant's estate goes far back.
Even Professor
MacLachlan's language that rejection does not deprive the tenant of its estate,
while newly added to the Bankruptcy Act in the Chandler Act amendments of
1938, was not new in substance, but merely attempted to codify what was
considered to be existing law. "This is a new provision and is declaratory of
the prior law. It is primarily intended to clarify the rights of the lessee of the
bankrupt."
JACOB WEINSTEIN, THE BANKRUPTCY LAW OF 1938 - A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 159 (1938). Mr. Weinstein was one of the three major
contributors to the drafting of § 70(b). See also Silverstein, supra note 28, at
487 (stating that it "seems an inescapable conclusion that the lessor provision
was intended to grant the lessee protection that the existing law either failed
to provide clearly or failed to provide at all").
43. STAFF OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AN ACT TO CORRECT
TECHNICAL ERRORS, CLARIFY AND MAKE MINOR SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES TO
PUBLIC LAW 95-598, H.R. REP. NO 96-1195 at 1 (1980).
44. See N. Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982)
(finding bankruptcy courts unconstitutional as they then existed pursuant to
section 241(a) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978); Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v.
Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 526 (1984) (holding labor contracts subject to
rejection).
45. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
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two concerns with § 365(h) as originally adopted in 1978.46 The
first was the language permitting the tenant to "treat the lease as
terminated" upon rejection of the lease in the landlord's
bankruptcy, which had been inserted as an alternative to
remaining in possession after the rejection. The second problem
was the language designed to protect the tenant by giving the
tenant the right to remain in "possession."
With respect to the tenant's right to treat the lease as
terminated, leasehold mortgagees were concerned that the tenant,
for any number of reasons, might be induced to make the election,
which arguably would terminate the security for the loan.
Lenders were not certain that the problem could be avoided by
inserting a provision in the mortgage under which the tenant
would agree not to treat the lease as terminated if the lease were
rejected in the landlord's bankruptcy, even if the tenant assigned
its right to make that election to the mortgagee, because of doubt
that the provision would be enforceable in the face of the language
of § 365(h) as enacted in 1978. The concern was that the section
could be construed in a landlord's bankruptcy to give a tenant,
who is not in bankruptcy, an ability to terminate its lease that it
would not have had under nonbankruptcy law. Congress shared
this concern. The question, again, was not whether something had
to be done, but how best to do it. An interim device was to enter in
the Congressional Record a dialogue between Congressmen Butler
and Edwards, the ranking minority member and Chair of the
Subcommittee, respectively. This was accomplished on December
3, 1980, when in response to a question from Congressman Butler
concerning the right to treat the lease as terminated,
Congressman Edwards replied: "Section 365(h) is not intended to
provide the debtor's lessee rights that would not otherwise exist
47
While this clarification might have
outside of bankruptcy."
helped in the "warm and fuzzy feeling" department during the
time an effective amendment was being drafted, it did not assuage
the concern of the leasehold mortgagees.
Stuart D. Root of Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft proposed
that language be added to the 1978 version of § 365(h) to provide
that "no interest created out of the leasehold estate" could be
"adversely affected" by the election of the non-debtor tenant to
48
The ACLI went along with that
treat the lease as terminated.
suggestion, but in light of congressional staff concerns that the
46. Section 365(h) as enacted in 1978 is set forth supra in the text
accompanying notes 29-41.
47. 126 CONG. REC. 31,917 (1980).
48. Letter from Stuart D. Root, Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, to Robert
Feidler, Counsel to Senator Dennis DeConcini (Mar. 7, 1979) (on file with the
St. John's University School of Law, Bankruptcy Legislative History
Collection).
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added language might be overly broad, reiterated a previous
suggestion it had made that would
delete the words giving the tenant the right to treat the lease as
terminated from § 365(h) and insert legislative history to the effect
that the deletion was not intended to change the law but simply to
avoid any incorrect interpretation that a special right in the
nonbankrupt tenant has been created thereby. 49
Recommended legislative history to meet this suggestion was
appended to the letter, which indicated that the deletion was made
to conform to nonbankruptcy law. It provided in part,
The lessee should be able to terminate the lease only where ... [the
rejection] amounts to such a breach as would entitle the lessee to
treat the lease as terminated by virtue of the terms of its lease,
other nonbankruptcy law or other agreements which the lessee has
made with leasehold mortgagees, sublessees or other parties. 50
Congress did not exactly adopt either suggestion. Instead the
staff left the offending language in the statute but inserted the
ACLI's proposed legislative history into the statute as well, which
resulted in the following language included in the 1984
amendments and now found in § 365(h)(1)(A)(i):
If the rejection by the trustee amounts to such a breach as would
entitle the lessee to treat such lease as terminated by virtue of its
terms, applicable nonbankruptcy law, or any agreement made by
the lessee, then the lessee under such lease may treat such lease as
terminated by the rejection.
This language was acceptable to leasehold mortgagees for the
reasons discussed in the following practice comment, and the
threat to leasehold financing in this regard ended.
PRACTICE

COMMENT:

In order to elect to treat the lease as

terminated, the tenant must meet one of the three conditions of the
amended language: (i) that the terms of the lease would permit the
tenant to treat the lease as terminated; (ii) nonbankruptcy law
would permit the termination; or (iii) the tenant's agreements with
third parties permit the termination.
The mortgagee can eliminate the first condition by insuring that the
lease does not contain such a provision.
With respect to the third condition, what has become known as the
"365(h) agreement" should be inserted in the mortgage under which
the tenant agrees that if the landlord is in bankruptcy and rejects
49. Letter from the author, then Chairman of the ACLI Subcommittee on
Federal Bankruptcy Legislation, to Congressman Don Edwards (Aug. 21,
1980) (on file with the St. John's University School of Law, Bankruptcy
Legislative History Collection).
50. Id.
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the lease, it will not elect to treat the lease as terminated. In
addition, the provision should assign to the mortgagee the tenant's
right to treat the lease as terminated.
The second condition, which might at first appear to be of concern,
was acceptable to the leasehold mortgagees because it simply
confirmed that the tenant retained in bankruptcy whatever right it
would have had under nonbankruptcy law to treat the lease as
terminated, such as upon a breach by the landlord that would
amount to constructive eviction. Constructive eviction is based on a
breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment contained in the
lease. Where that covenant is breached, the tenant normally has
the right to move out and stop paying rent. The reference to tenant's
rights under nonbankruptcy law in the proposed legislative history,
inserted by the staff in the statutory language, was made because,
as discussed above, the argument for the amendment had been that
the tenant should not be granted any right it would not have had
outside of bankruptcy. Consequently it appeared necessary to show
that the amendment would not deprive the tenant of any right it
would have had outside of bankruptcy.
The lenders accepted this language because the risk was small that
rejection in bankruptcy, given the terms of § 365(h), would amount
to constructive eviction under nonbankruptcy law. Also, since the
section refers to rights under nonbankruptcy law, it was felt that
the tenant's rights under nonbankruptcy law could be modified by
agreement, at least where the waiver is not considered
51
Since constructive
unconscionable or against public policy.
covenant of quiet
implied
the
of
breach
on
eviction is based
enjoyment, at least a commercial tenant ought to be able to agree to
waive the application of those rights when the landlord is in
bankruptcy and rejects the lease. Thus a provision in the mortgage
under which the tenant agrees that it will not move out, surrender
the lease or declare the lease terminated based on any breach by the
landlord occasioned by the rejection of the lease in the landlord's
bankruptcy, would be helpful. As discussed in the text after note 72,
the 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code provided additional
protection against this risk by the addition of subsection D to
§ 365(h)(1).
The second problem with the original version of § 365(h) as
enacted in the 1978 Code, was the language designed to protect
the tenant on the landlord's bankruptcy by permitting the
"lessee... to remain in possession" in the face of rejection by the
The fear was that the courts would interpret
landlord. 52
"possession" to protect only physical possession of the premises. 53
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD AND TENANT
§ 5.6 (1977); MILTON R. FRIEDMAN AND PATRICK A. RANDOLPH, JR., FRIEDMAN

ON LEASES § 29:3.3 (5th ed. 2004)
52. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
53. There had been some testimony before the Subcommittee on Courts of
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In most ground lease situations, such as those in connection with
the Park Avenue Properties, the ground tenant is not in physical
possession, nor is the tenant in physical possession anytime the
property is subleased. What such tenant actually "possesses" is a
leasehold estate.5 4 If the courts were to misinterpret this language
to refer to physical possession, many lessees and leasehold
mortgagees would have been in a worse position than they were
under § 70(b) of the Bankruptcy Act. 55 Discussions with the
counsel to the subcommittees56 who had been involved in the
drafting of the section revealed that the original "possession"
language had been inserted not to limit the protection afforded by
the section to tenants in physical possession, but to avoid the
application of § 365(h) protection to a lease that had not yet
commenced (the idea being that such a lease was merely an
executory contract and should be treated the same as any other
executory contract).
The ACLI's suggested revision to avoid the problem was to
delete the words "in possession" in both § 365(h)(1) and (2) and
insert a clause stating that the tenant may remain "as lessee
under a lease the term of which has commenced." 57 What finally
came out of the drafting process 58 provided that on rejection by the
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary that had indicated the protection of
§ 365(h) might apply only where the lessee is physically in possession. See
Letter from the author, then Chairman of the ACLI Subcommittee on Federal
Bankruptcy Legislation, to Senator Robert J. Dole, the Chair of the
Subcommittee responsible for bankruptcy legislation (Nov. 6, 1981) (on file
with the St. John's University School of Law, Bankruptcy Legislative History
Collection) (reacting to that testimony and stating in
'possession' were interpreted so technically, doubts would part: "If the word
be created about the
efficacy of the protection granted by section 365(h) when property is subleased.
Even if possession by a sublessee were considered possession by the lessee, it
would not be clear whether a trustee for a landlord would be able to terminate
if the sublessee had moved out or been evicted, or if, in connection with a
'ground' lease of an entire office building, some space had become
vacant)."
54. See In re Lee Rd. Partners, Ltd., 155 B.R. 55, 60 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1993)
(holding that the definition of possession is not limited to physical possession
of the premises but includes possession of the leasehold estate); 63C AM. JUR.
2D Property§ 28 (2d ed. 1997).
55. Under § 70(b) of the Bankruptcy Act, there was no question that the
tenant's "estate" would be protected, at least in the event of liquidation.
Under the new law, an interpretation that the tenant must be in physical
possession to retain its rights would mean that tenants not in physical
possession would lose their estates.
56. See supra note 38.
57. Letter from the author, then Chairman of the ACLI Subcommittee on
the Federal Bankruptcy Legislation, to Senator Robert J. Dole, the Chair of
the Subcommittee responsible for bankruptcy legislation (Nov. 6, 1981) (on file
at the St. John's University School of Law, Bankruptcy Legislative History
Collection).
58. The drafting also dealt with the concern of the time-share industry as a
result of the case of Sombrero Reef Club, Inc. v. Allman (In re Sombrero Reef
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landlord the tenant may remain in "possession of the leasehold...
59
This
under any lease... the term of which has commenced."
the
that
finding
from
clause was designed to prevent a court
physical
in
was
tenant
protection of § 365(h) applied only if the
possession. And it worked-for about nine years.
C. The 1994 Amendments
The first big dent in the 1984 amendments came with In re
60
Carlton Restaurant,Inc. In that case, a landlord had previously
filed in bankruptcy and rejected the lease of a restaurant. The
tenant had elected to remain in possession of the leasehold under
§ 365(h). Later the tenant filed in bankruptcy under Chapter 7
and moved to assume and assign the lease. Judge Scholl held that
the tenant had nothing to assume or assign because all it got when
it elected to remain in possession of the leasehold were its rights
under the lease while the tenant was in physical possession and
on assignment. No mention was
that those rights would be lost
61
made of the 1984 amendment.
Following the decision in Carlton Restaurant, other courts
joined in. In Arden & Howe, the U.S. District Court in California
held, without referring to the 1984 addition of the words "of the
leasehold" after "possession," that under the plain meaning of
§ 365(h) as amended in 1984, the tenant's election to remain in
62
possession "protects only possession, term and rent obligations."
Thus the landlord did not have to comply with restrictive
covenants in the lease. Not to be outdone, the U.S. District Court
in South Carolina affirmed a decision of a bankruptcy court that a

Club, Inc.), 18 B.R. 612 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982), which permitted rejection of
time-share contracts (not amounting to real property interests) in the
bankruptcy of the Club entering into the time-share agreements. The Club
had proposed to reject the contracts as a prelude to sale of the entire property.
Id. at 614. Perhaps for strategy reasons (they might not have wanted the
contracts to be considered interests in the property), there appears to have
been no attempt to sell the fee under § 363(f) free and clear of the contracts.
59. See The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 402, 98 Stat.*333 (emphasis added).
60. 151 B.R. 353 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993).
61. Id. at 356. Said the court:
[W]hile the Code limits the rights of a landlord-debtor, it does not
purport to saddle it with a bad deal for any period beyond that required
to prevent the dispossession of the lessee, pursuant to the policy of
preventing forcible evictions of tenants in possession wherever
possible.... If a lessee.., has closed its doors and does not intend to
utilize the leasehold itself in the future, the policy against preventing a
forcible eviction vanishes.
Id. Remarkable.
62. Home Express, Inc. v. Arden & Howe Assocs., Ltd. (In re Arden and
Howe Assocs., Ltd.), No. CVS-92-811 1993 WL 129784, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 1,
1993), aff'g 152 B.R. 971 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1993).
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tenant was not in possession of premises sublet to a party in
actual possession, within the meaning of § 365(h).63
The position taken by these cases was not unanimous. In Lee
Road Partners,64 U.S. District Court Judge Raymond Dearie
affirmed Chief Judge Duberstein's holding that the tenant need
not be in physical possession of the premises to obtain the benefit
of the 1984 version of § 365(h) because, inter alia, (i) the word
"possession" encompasses control, occupancy or
ownership, and (ii)
the statute refers to possession of the "leasehold," which includes
the tenant's interest under the lease contract. 65 Furthermore, in
Chestnut Ridge Plaza Associates,66 Judge Judith Fitzgerald held
that the terms of the lease remain operative as part of the
leasehold after rejection by the landlord, relying on and approving
the decision in Lee Road Partners.67
Notwithstanding that some courts correctly analyzed the
Bankruptcy Code and rejected the few poorly reasoned cases, and
that none of the few problematic cases were decisions of a U.S.
Court of Appeals, the concern in the real estate community was so
great that leasehold financing in the nation was brought to a halt.
It was then that the Marino Committee, discussed in the
introduction to this Article, composed of real estate lawyers,
bankruptcy lawyers, lenders' representatives, legislative experts
and an academic, was organized. 6 That Committee orchestrated
63. In re Harborview Dev. 1986 L.P., 152 B.R. 897 (D.S.C. 1993). The case

may have turned on equitable considerations including the insider nature of
the tenant and the possibility that the lease was being used to funnel funds
from the landlord to the insiders. However, the analysis of § 365(h), used to
support the conclusion is a huge non-sequitur. Interestingly, both this case
and Arden & Howe viewed rejection as a termination of the lease,
notwithstanding § 365(g), which provides that except where the tenant elects
to treat the lease as terminated on rejection in the landlord's bankruptcy,
rejection constitutes a breach of the lease.
64. Lee Rd. Partners, Ltd. v. F. W. Woolworth Co. (In re Lee Rd. Partners,
Ltd.), 169 B.R. 507 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), aff'g 155 B.R. 55 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1993).
65. As proof that wisdom increases with age (I like to think so), Judge
Duberstein, at 88, is the oldest Chief Bankruptcy Judge and probably the
oldest fully active bankruptcy judge in the nation. Jay Meyers, Judge Conrad
B. Duberstein, Still Going Strong at 87, RICHMOND COUNTY BAR ASS'N J.,
Winter 2003, at 20.
66. Chestnut Ridge Plaza Assocs. L.P. v. Fox Grocery Co. (In re Chestnut
Ridge Plaza Assocs. L.P.) 156 B.R. 477 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993).
67. Proof, of course, that wisdom is not limited to senior citizens.
68. Members of the informal Marino Committee and their affiliations at the
time were: Steven Alden (Debevoise & Plimpton), Laurence Cherkis (Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen & Katz), Jeffrey Deboer (National Realty Committee), Joseph P.
Forte (Thacher Proffitt & Wood), Kevin Hackett (Fried, Frank, Harris,
Schriver & Jacobson), Lawrence Mittman (Battle Fowler), Jay Neveloff
(Kramer, Levin, Naftalis, Nessen Kamin & Frankel), Betty Robins (Teachers
Insurance & Annuity Association), Dean Rogeness (Massachusetts Mutual
Life Insurance Co.), Edward Sack (International Council of Shopping Centers),
Joseph Senker (Sullivan & Cromwell), Ann Von Eigen (American Land Title
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an incredible, last minute, congressional educational effort,
resulting in an amendment being added to the Senate Bill after it
had already gone to the floor. After some relatively minor changes
by the House, it was enacted as § 205 of the Bankruptcy Reform
9
Act of 1994.6
The amendment provided that when a lease is rejected on
behalf of a landlord in bankruptcy, the tenant may retain "its
rights under such lease (including rights such as those relating to
the amount and timing of payment of rent and other amounts
payable by the lessee and any right to use, possession, quiet
enjoyment, subletting, assignment, or hypothecation) that are in
or appurtenant 70 to the real property. ....,,71Leasehold financing
then resumed.
In addition to the modification described above, another
change to § 365(h) in the 1994 amendment was the addition, at the
suggestion of the Marino Committee, of subsection (D) to
Association), Ronald Wilcomes (Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.), Mitchell
Williams (Thacher Proffitt & Wood), and Robert M. Zinman (St. John's
University, School of Law).
69. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 205, 108 Stat.
4106, 4122-23. The amendment in relevant part (§ 361(h)(1)(A)(ii)) reads as
follows:
if the term of such lease has commenced, the lessee may retain its rights
under such lease (including rights such as those relating to the amount
and timing of payment of rent and other amounts payable by the lessee
and any right of use, possession, quiet enjoyment, subletting,
assignment, or hypothecation) that are in or appurtenant to the real
property for the balance of the term of such lease and for any renewal or
extension of such rights to the extent that such rights are enforceable
under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
Another modification in the amendment to § 365(h) involved the tenant's
remedy for damages caused by a landlord's non-performance of lease
covenants under § 365(h)(1)(B). Under the law as it existed at the time of the
passage of the 1994 Amendments, the tenant was limited to an offset against
the

rent of "any damage ...

caused by the

nonperformance ...of any

obligation of the [landlord] .. " At some point the House changed the offset to
"the value of any damage. ." What was intended by this change is not clear.
One wonders if the language refers to the value to the landlord in not
performing certain obligations, or the cost (or, perhaps, reasonable cost) to the
tenant in performing those obligations.
70. This limitation has an apparent exception in a separate subsection (C)
to § 365(h)(1), which provides that rejection of a lease in a shopping center
"does not affect the enforceability under applicable nonbankruptcy law of any
provision in the lease pertaining to radius, location, use, exclusivity, or tenant
mix or balance," presumably whether the provision is appurtenant or not. 11
U.S.C. § 365(h)(1).
71. The force of this provision was reiterated by Congressman Brooks in his
section-by-section extension of remarks explanation of the bill. He stated that
the rights retained by the tenant after the landlord's rejection "include the
amount and timing of payment of rent or other amounts payable by the lessee,
the right to use, possess, quiet enjoyment, sublet or assign." 140 CONG. REC.
27,694 (1994).
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§ 365(h)(1). It provides that in paragraph (h), "'lessee' includes
any successor, assign, or mortgagee permitted under the terms of
such lease." The purpose for the change was not just to indicate
that successors to the tenant, including foreclosing mortgagees,
have the same rights as the tenant. The concern was how to
insure that where the tenant had discretion, the discretion would
not be exercised to the detriment of the mortgagee. Remember
that under § 365(h), on rejection of the lease in the landlord's
bankruptcy the tenant was given the option of treating the lease
as terminated. The concern of the leasehold mortgagees lead to
the 1984 amendment discussed above.
However, as can be seen from the Practice Comment,72 there
was some basis for a lingering but minor concern about how the
amendment would be interpreted. As perhaps an indication of the
aura of paranoia that resulted from the frustrations in trying to
get the intention of Congress recognized by the courts,
§ 365(h)(1)(D), was designed to backstop the 1984 change by
making it clear that when the section says that the "lessee" may
treat the lease as terminated, the lessee's decision would have to
be made jointly by the tenant and the leasehold mortgagee. 73
D. What the ForegoingLegislative History Tells Us
What we have seen from the foregoing legislative analysis is
that Congress, again and again, from the drafting of the Code to
the amendments that followed over the years, expressed in
concrete statutory provisions its intention to protect the tenant's
estate and the rights of those with interests in that estate when
the lease is disaffirmed in the landlord's bankruptcy. On its face,
this view is inconsistent with the notion that Congress intended
that the landlord could easily avoid these protections by employing
§ 363 in lieu of § 365. Whether the protections can or can not be
easily avoided under § 363 will be covered in the next section of
this Article.
In addition, the legislative history of § 365(h) tells us a great
deal about how Qualitech and § 363 should be interpreted, and
what statutory amendments may be necessary to protect the
72. See supra Practice Comment in Part I.B. of this Article.
73. The amendment is not, however, as clear as it might be. There is
virtually no legislative history on this change. However, Collier published a
"Special Supplement" on the amendments, prepared by Professor Lawrence P.
King. In describing the change, Professor King stated "In addition, the term
'lessee' is defined to include any successor, assignee, or mortgagee permitted
under the lease, thus extending the protection of section 365 to such parties."
Lawrence P. King, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, in COLLIER SPECIAL
SUPPLEMENT, 4 (1994). One can read what one would like into that language.
This throw-in by the Marino Committee may yet be the subject of litigation.
Bismark is said to have said that no person should ever see how laws, or
sausages, are made. He may have been correct.
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rights of the tenant under § 365(h) from a § 363(f) attack. As a
result, many references to this legislative history will be made in
the material that follows.

II. QUALITECH AND SALES FREE AND CLEAR OF LEASES IN
THE LANDLORD'S BANKRUPTCY
Before examining the Qualitech holding, it is important to
note that the facts in the case and the actions or failure to act of
counsel, are what one can consider odd.74 They may lead to an
initial reaction to the case, which this author concedes he first
had, of "so what?" Analysis of the issues involved, however,
demonstrates that such a reaction is a mistake. The facts and acts
or failure to act by the parties in the case should not obscure the
very serious issues the case reveals.
A. PeculiarFacts and Circumstancesof the Case
An example of the seemingly strange facts can be found in the
tenant's failure (i) to object to the landlord's motion to sell free and
clear of the lease under § 363(f), or (ii) to request adequate
protection under § 363(e). This contributes to a tendency to chalk
the case off to bad lawyering and to dismiss discussion of the case

74. The facts are also somewhat complex. Qualitech Steel Corporation
("Landlord") owned and operated a steel mill. It leased a portion of its
property to Precision Industries ("Tenant") in order to facilitate a separate
supply agreement, under which the Tenant would construct and operate a
supply warehouse on the leased property. During the term of the lease the
buildings and improvements would be the property of the Tenant but the
Landlord could purchase them for one dollar at the expiration of the lease.
The lease further provided that if there were an early termination or default
under this lease or supply agreement the Tenant would be able to remove all
improvements and fixtures it placed on the property. The rent was one dollar
per year but the district court points out that the Landlord received the right
to purchase the improvements for one dollar at the conclusion of the lease as
well as having the benefit of an on-site supplier during the term of the lease.
Precision Indus., Inc. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC, No. IPOO-0247-C-HIG,
2001 WL 699881, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 24, 2001). The Landlord's property was
subject to approximately $240 million in mortgage liens that were prior to the
lease. The lease was not recorded. The sale to the successor of the Landlord
free and clear of interests was approved by the Landlord's bankruptcy court in
August 1999. Tenant had made no objection to the sale under § 363(f) and did
not request adequate protection under § 363(e). The sale order indicated that
the purchaser could designate what contracts and leases would be "assumed"
by a date, which was postponed for about three months to December 3, 1999,
but the purchasers did not elect to assume or reject the lease or supply
agreement. The bankruptcy court held that the lease had been rejected by the
failure to assume (although § 365(d)(4)'s automatic rejection provision for
Chapter 11 applies only when the debtor is the lessee), and that the sale had
already extinguished the interest of the Tenant. The district court reversed.
The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court. Precision Indus., Inc. v.
Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC, 327 F.3d 537 (7th Cir. 2003).
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on that ground.
However, it is possible that, under the
circumstances of the case, the lawyers involved may be getting a
raw deal. One explanation that has been offered for the less than
pro-active stance of the attorneys for the tenant is that the notice
they received was insufficient to alert them to the need to act. 75 In
addition, there may be other reasons associated with the situation
the tenant was in, under the strange facts of the case, that might
have been the basis for the inaction. For example, it is possible
that the tenant felt there was little or no chance that litigation
would prevent a sale free and clear, or would result in adequate
protection, and that objections to the sale and motions demanding
adequate protection would have been a waste of time and money.
It is not clear whether the tenant would have had a basis for
that conclusion. However, with respect to objecting to a sale free
and clear, the Seventh Circuit indicated that at least one of the
prerequisites had been met (only one of the five § 363(f)
prerequisites is necessary to sell free and clear), and as the
discussion below shows, there is a reasonable possibility that more
than one of the prerequisites had been satisfied. If this were true,
then it would make little sense to litigate an issue one has no
chance of winning.
As to the failure to request adequate protection under § 363(e)
(if you don't ask for it, you can't get it), the tenant may have
believed that such a request would have been fruitless. The facts
reveal that there were mortgages on the fee well in excess of the
value of the property, including the lease. 76 Adequate protection is
designed to compensate for any decrease in the value of the
interest caused by the automatic stay under § 362, the use, sale or

75. Alec Ostrow raised this issue in 2003 on a Panel at the Annual Meeting

of the National Association of Bankruptcy Trustees. Alec P. Ostrow, Qualitech
and Sales Free and Clear of Leasehold Interests:Bankruptcy Process and Due
Process, in 2003 ANNUAL CONVENTION OF NAT'L ASS'N OF BANKR. TRS. 7

(2003). The Seventh Circuit opinion stated that "Precision, which had notice of
the hearing, did not object to the Sale Order." Qualitech, 327 F.3d at 541.
However, it is unclear what form of notice the tenant received and whether it
met constitutional due process requirements. See Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) which requires notice to be
"reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties ....
Professor Ostrow points out that the Seventh Circuit noted that
the Sale Order also "reserved for the purchaser the debtor's right to assume
and assign executory contracts .. " Qualitech, 327 F.3d at 541. This, together
with the fact that negotiations were proceeding between the landlord and
tenant with respect to assumption of the lease, tends to indicate that there is
validity to Alec Ostrow's concern, and raises broad issues as to the sufficiency
of notices in bankruptcy proceedings.
76. At the sale free and clear, all of Qualitech's assets were sold for a credit
bid of $180 million. At that time there was more than $380 million in secured
claims against the debtor's estate. The balance on the mortgage held by the
purchasers at the sale was $263 million. Qualitech, 327 F.3d at 540.
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lease of property of the estate under § 363, or the obtaining of
credit for the debtor under § 364. Section 361 provides that
adequate protection, as substantially defined in that section, gives
protection to the extent of any "decrease in the value of such [nondebtor] entity's interest in such property" or grants "the
77
indubitable equivalent of such entity's interest in such property."
Because of the prior mortgages on the fee in Qualitech, the
leasehold would have been wiped out on foreclosure of the
mortgages or on any Chapter 7 distribution in bankruptcy of the
assets of the landlord. Thus, if the tenant had requested adequate
protection, it is likely that the court would have found that the
78
tenant had no property interest of value to protect.
If the foregoing is correct, counsel's failure to object to the sale
or ask for adequate protection may not have been so strange at all.
The only strange thing might be that the case was then appealed
all the way to the Seventh Circuit. It would seem that the decision
to appeal could only be based on the belief, which is reflected in at
least one law review comment on the case, 79 that while adequate
protection under § 363(e) would not have protected the tenant,8 0 if
§ 365(h) had been allowed to govern, the lease would have been
preserved notwithstanding the prior mortgages on the fee. Section
365(h)(1)(A)(ii) only allows the tenant to preserve "its rights"
under the lease and does not afford the tenant rights it does not
have under nonbankruptcy law. 8 ' However, while it is clear that
the prior mortgages would have devoured the lease in a
foreclosure, it is not clear that the lease would have been cut off in
bankruptcy if § 365 trumped §363. For example, if a plan of
reorganization is confirmed under which the lien of the mortgage
is retained,8 2 the lease would continue in effect as long as debt

77. 11 U.S.C. § 361.
78. On the other hand, my colleague, Professor Richard Lieb, correctly
points out that under nonbankruptcy law the tenant can stay in possession
until there is a judgment of foreclosure. Since the foreclosure has not taken
place, the tenant still had a right of possession, which would have value for
which § 363(e) should provide compensation. However, given the limited
amount of compensation that might be available for this limited right, a
conclusion not to litigate the issue could appear understandable.
79. Baxter, supra note 8.
80. This is true, and may be true outside the facts of Qualitech, but it does
not mean that the lease would have been protected under § 365(h).
81. See supra Practice Comment accompanying note 51, and the Practice
Comment that follows (discussing how the 1984 amendments were designed to
make certain that the Code granted no rights to a tenant affected by a
landlord's bankruptcy that the tenant did not have outside of bankruptcy).
82. Assume the landlord rejected the lease and the tenant elected to retain
its rights as authorized by § 365(h). Assume further that under the landlord's
plan of reorganization, the lien of the mortgage would be retained but stripped
down under §§ 506(a) and 1129(b)(2)(A) to the value of the collateral. The
mortgagee would undoubtedly vote its unsecured deficiency claim against the
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service under the mortgage were continued to be paid and the
tenant does not default under the lease. Nevertheless it is difficult
to see this rather remote possibility being the basis for an appeal
to the Seventh Circuit.
What is even more curious is that the lease was originally
entered into notwithstanding the prior mortgages on the fee. A
prospective tenant is, of course, not without recourse when the fee
interest is subject to a prior lien. It is normal, almost mandatory,
for the tenant to request a subordination of the mortgages to the
lease. If that happens, foreclosure of the mortgages would be
subject to any prior interests in the fee, including the lease.8 3
Indeed, the leasing of the Park Avenue Properties, the rejection of
which in the bankruptcy of the Penn Central Railroad provided
the impetus for the development of § 365(h) of the Bankruptcy
Code, would not have been possible without some form of
subordination of the corporate indentures covering all of the
railroad's property.8 4 Mortgagees are often willing to enter into a
plan. However, if the plan is nevertheless confirmed because the unsecured
class does not reject the plan, or the landlord keeps the property under a
lawful new value plan notwithstanding the ambiguities left us by the Supreme
Court in Bank of America v. 203 N. LaSalle Street Partnership,526 U.S. 434
(1999), the result would be that the landlord owns the property subject to a
100% of value mortgage and a rejected lease under which the tenant has
elected to retain its rights. If, then, the landlord pays the debt service on the
mortgage and the tenant performs as required under the lease, the lease
would not be affected by the reorganization. In this situation, the dominance
of § 365(h) over § 363(f) would have the effect of preserving the lease.
83. In lieu of a subordination, fee mortgagees may offer a nondisturbance
agreement. Under such an agreement, the mortgagee agrees that if it
forecloses, it will not cut off the tenant on foreclosure and the tenant agrees to
attorn to, or recognize, the landlord as its landlord under the lease. The
problem with the nondisturbance/attornment agreement is that, unless the
drafting is done extremely carefully, it will be considered an executory
contract, which can be rejected in the bankruptcy of at least those mortgagees
subject to the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(d). See infra Practice
Comment in Part C.l.(a)., which discusses the nondisturbance agreement in
the context of a sale free and clear under § 363(f)(1).
84. Apparently the trustee for the railroad's bondholders had authority to
release property from the lien of the indenture, but no authority in the
indenture to subordinate the lien. The attorneys for the trustees reached back
to their first year Property law school learning that a lease was a conveyance
as well as a contract. If they would remove all the contract provisions from
the lease and, in a sense, recreate a feudal grant of an estate for a term of
years, they would have a "conveyance," which would enable them to release
the lien of the indenture from the properties, execute a "grant of term" to a
subsidiary of the railroad, and then spread the mortgage back to the
properties, now subordinate to the grant of term. The subsidiary holding the
grant of term would then lease the property to the ground lessee. Since the
grant of term was superior to the mortgages, all interests arising out of the
grant of term would be accorded priority over the mortgages. As an additional
benefit from all this, when Penn Central attempted to reject the leases, the
tenants argued that Penn Central had conveyed the grant of term and thus

2004]

The Sad History of § 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code

subordination in order to obtain a tenant for the property because
the tenant will be the source of the rent that will pay the debt
service.8 5 It is thus surprising that the Qualitech lease, which was
important enough to bring an appeal to the Seventh Circuit, did
not seem important enough to cause the tenant to obtain a
subordination of the fee mortgage to the lease.
The final surprise is a good one. The Seventh Circuit did
not find that this lease was not a "true lease" under the
Bankruptcy Code, notwithstanding the peculiar nature of the
lease, which included rent at one dollar per year. Some cases in
the federal courts have tended to disregard the mandate of the
Supreme Court to interpret the Code in light of state law8 6 and
have found leases, valid under state law, 8 7 not to be true leases
under the Bankruptcy Code. 88 Hopefully, the Seventh Circuit has
now brought us back to a more reasonable interpretation of the
Bankruptcy Code.
B. Looking Through the Facts to the Issues
In order to analyze the implications of the Qualitech decision,
was not in a position to reject it or anything created out of the grant. See the

use of the grant of term in the Park Avenue Properties, supra note 25.
85. See GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE
LAW § 12.9, at 246-49 (4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter NELSON & WHITMAN].
86. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 53-54 (1979) (stating that
unless federal interest requires different result, state law should apply in
bankruptcy proceedings).
87. A lease is a conveyance of a term to a tenant under which the landlord
retains a meaningful reversion. The purpose for which the lease is entered
into should not be an issue in determining whether a lease was created.
88. Liona Corp. v. PCH Assocs., (In re PCH Assocs.) 804 F.2d 193 (2d Cir.
1986), where the court concluded that leases for financing purposes, were not
to be recognized as leases in bankruptcy, finding "explicit authority" for this
conclusion in the legislative history to § 502(b)(6) (a provision restricting a
landlord's claim in the tenant's bankruptcy to a maximum of three years rent).
The court pointed out that the Senate Report stated that the phrase 'lease of
real property' does not apply to lease financing transactions." Id. at 199. The
court failed to quote and completely disregarded the prefatory phrase to that
S. REP.
statement which was: "As used in § 502(b)(7) [now § 502(b)(6)] ....
NO. 95-989, at 63 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N., 5787, 5850. If
anything, this prefatory statement would seem explicit authority not to apply
the language in other provisions, especially in light of the language of § 365(m)
which defines lease of real property "for purposes of this section 365..." as
including "any rental agreement to use real property" without any reference to
the purpose for which the lease was written. 11 U.S.C. § 365(m). The reason
the Senate Report stated that financing leases would not be covered by
§ 502(b)(6) was that a financing lease is essentially a security for repayment
and should not be subject to the limitation on the landlord's claim designed for
non-financing leases. S. REP. No. 95-989 at 63 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N., 5787, 5849-50. See also David Albenda & Daniel S. Lief, Net
Lease FinancingTransactions Under the Proposed Bankruptcy Act of 1973, 30
BUS. LAW. 713 (1975).
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it is necessary to look beyond the facts to the issues involved. The
Seventh Circuit, in holding that the landlord's fee may be sold free
and clear of the lease, stated that § 363 provided protection for the
parties adversely affected by a sale free and clear. In analyzing
the case we will consider the following questions: (1) Was the
holding technically "correct" when it said that notwithstanding the
protections built into § 365(h) for the tenant on rejection of the
lease in the landlord's bankruptcy, § 363 permits sale free and
clear of the lease without those protections? (2) If the holding in
Qualitech is correct, are the protections provided by § 363
sufficient to protect the interests of the tenant and leasehold
mortgagee?
C. Was Qualitech Correct?
The real estate community's harsh reaction to the Qualitech
decision was generated in part by the long history of the
development of § 365(h) and the conviction that all of the
protection for the tenant was tied up in that subsection. The
Seventh Circuit, in refusing to find that § 365(h) trumped § 363,
was confronted with the fact that while the language of § 363
clearly covered leases, it is far less specific with respect to leases
than § 365. Real estate people argued that the specific provisions
of § 365(h), which deal solely with protection for the tenant when
the lease is rejected in the landlord's bankruptcy, should have
prevailed over the more general provisions of § 363.
We are all aware of the canon of construction that gives rise
to that conclusion.8 9 What the Seventh Circuit pointed out,
however, was that the canon should only apply when there are two
provisions dealing with the same thing and produce different
results. Judge Rovner, writing for the panel, found that the two
sections are not in conflict, but concern "two distinct sets of
circumstances." 90 Under § 365, the landlord retains ownership of
the property, while under Section 363, the landlord disposes of the
fee interest either subject to, or free and clear of the lease. 91 The
distinction between the two provisions was that the landlord gives
up ownership of the property to sell free and clear and retains
ownership when it rejects.
Of course, from the tenant's
standpoint, if the landlord retains ownership and rejects the lease,
§ 365(h) would recognize and protect the tenant's estate, while
under § 363 the tenant's estate is not protected. Nevertheless,
Judge Rovner points out that § 363 contains its own protection for

89. See,

e.g.,

3A

NORMAN

J.

SINGER,

STATUTES

AND

STATUTORY

CONSTRUCTION §70.6, at 527 (6th ed. 2003) (stating a "more specific statute
controls over a more general one").
90. Qualitech, 327 F.3d at 547.

91. Id.
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interests adversely affected by a sale. free and clear. 92 Thus the
Seventh Circuit is saying, in effect, that contrasting the specificity
of two sections that deal with different things only invites the
apples and oranges comparison.
The Seventh Circuit's conclusion receives support from the
fact that there appears to be no ambiguity in the language of the
Code that could give rise to a contention that Congress intended
§ 365 to trump § 363. The provisions are clear and make no
reference to each other in this respect. Throughout the Code, the
drafters took special care to refer to any other provision that could
conflict or give rise to ambiguity. This is especially true of § 363.
For example, § 363(d) states that "The trustee may use, sell, or
lease property under subsection (b) or (c) of this section only to the
extent not inconsistent with any relief granted under section
362(c), 362(d), 362(e), or 362(f) of this title."93 If Congress intended
to give priority to § 365(h), it would have been simple to add "and
§ 365(h)" to that language.
That Congress can manage to refer directly to § 365 within
the confines of § 363 when it wants to, can be seen in § 363(l)
which provides: "Subject to the provisions of section 365, the
trustee may use, sell, or lease property under subsection (b) or
(c)... notwithstanding any provision in a contract, a lease or
applicable law that is conditioned on the insolvency or financial
condition of the debtor." As discussed below, the "subject to"
language in § 363() was intended to refer to the exceptions to
similar restrictions in § 365, which should be made applicable in
§ 363 as well.
Interestingly, Michael Baxter, who maintains that Qualitech
was incorrectly decided, claims that § 363(l), which is used here to
illustrate the fact that Congress explicitly adverted to § 365 when
it wrote § 363 but did not deal with § 365(h), "is compelling
evidence of Congressional intent to subordinate § 363 sales to
Baxter
§ 365, including the lessee protections of § 365(h)."94
be
read
must
in
§
363(l)
§
365"
to
"subject
explains that the words
to make all of § 363 subject to all of § 365 because if it "were
intended to be applicable only with respect to ipso facto or
bankruptcy clauses, the proviso would have referred specifically to
§ 365(e)(2) rather than to § 365 generally." 95
Baxter seems to be saying that § 363() was designed to make
the right to use, sell, or lease property of the estate subject to the
requirements of § 365, and that the prohibition on ipso facto
clauses was an afterthought. Unfortunately, the converse was the
Section 363(e), which provides for adequate protection, will be
92. Id.
discussed below.
93. 11 U.S.C. § 363(d).
94. Baxter, supra note 8, at 485.
95. Id. at 484
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case. Section 363(l) was intended only to deal with clauses that
might prevent use, sale, or lease based on the insolvency or
financial condition or filing in bankruptcy by the debtor. Indeed,
the "subject to § 365" language was not found in the original
version of the section enacted in 1978.
As discussed above in connection with the 1984 amendments
to the Bankruptcy Code, shortly after the Code was enacted and
before it became effective, a "technical amendments" bill was being
drafted to correct ambiguities and errors that had crept into the
Code as originally enacted. 96 The technical amendments bill
eventually became part of the Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act enacted in 1984. 97 One of the technical
amendments was to add "Subject to § 365" to § 363(). This author
confesses that he may have been primarily responsible for this
change. On February 14, 1979, as Chair of the Subcommittee on
Federal Bankruptcy Legislation of the ACLI,98 I wrote to both
Senator Dennis DeConcini, Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, the subcommittee responsible for bankruptcy
legislation on the Senate side, and to Congressman Don Edwards,
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, the subcommittee
responsible for bankruptcy legislation in the House of
Representatives, urging enactment of certain amendments. In
recommendation 5, I explained that § 363(l) as written abrogated
so called ipso facto clauses under which contracts and leases could
be terminated because of, inter alia, insolvency or the filing of a
petition in bankruptcy, but that it did not incorporate the
exceptions to those provisions found in similar provisions of
§ 365. 99 The failure to limit the anti ipso facto language by those
exceptions in § 363, it was argued, would not make sense. Since
we were dealing with "technical amendments" it was not feasible
to achieve a reworking of subsection (1) by including the extensive
exception language, and thus my letter suggested "a technical
amendment" that would add at the beginning of subparagraph ()
of § 363 "Subject to § 365."100
96. See supra note 43.
97. The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333.
98. See supra note 36
99. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c), (e), (f).
100. Letter from the author, to Senator Dennis DeConcini, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, and Congressman Don Edwards, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on
the Judiciary (February 14, 1979) (on file at the St. John's University School
of Law, Bankruptcy Legislative History Collection). The paragraph read in
large part as follows:
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Thus, it would seem that the "subject to" language of
subsection (1) was intended only to incorporate exceptions in
similar clauses in § 365.101 Even if Congress actually intended
that the "subject to" language have the effect of making § 363
subject to § 365, to put the "subject to" language in the provision
designed to deal with ipso facto clauses in an attempt to
subordinate all of § 363 to all of § 365 would simply constitute
illogical drafting. If Congress had the intent to subordinate all of
§ 363 to § 365, it would have been so simple to make that clear in
other ways. Thus, while the Baxter argument is innovative, it
would seem more of a straw for which to clutch, than a reed on
which to lean.
The title of this section is "Was Qualitech Correct?" In this
author's view, the answer may well be "yes" based on the statutory
language, notwithstanding the fact that the Qualitech result was
certainly not contemplated when the Bankruptcy Code was
drafted. However, whether one agrees that the holding was
correct or not, the fact must be accepted that Qualitech is the law
of the Seventh Circuit and there is a good possibility that it will be
followed by other courts. Nevertheless, if there is significant
protection for the person with an interest in the property being
sold under § 363, the argument that § 365 trumps § 363 becomes
merely an academic one. The question, then, is: what kind of
protection does § 363 provide to those with interests in the
property being sold?

Section 363() Use, Sale or Lease of Property. Section 363() permits
the trustee to use, sell or lease property notwithstanding provisions in a
contract, lease or applicable law ...conditioned on the solvency of the
debtor.... Section 365 contains certain limitations on the restriction on
termination and on the liability [sic - "ability" was intended] of the
trustee to assume and assign. Section 363() is not expressly made
subject to these limitations. Obviously, for § 365 to make sense § 363()
should be read as affected by it. However, the matter would be clarified
by a technical amendment which would add at the beginning of
subparagraph () of § 363 "Subject to § 365". It is urged that this change
be made.
The Committee, by inserting the language requested, understood the need to
make § 363 consistent with § 365 but it, and this author, either failed to look
beyond the language of Section 365(h) to see the potential in § 363(f) for sales
of leases free and clear of the Qualitech variety, or accepted the common
wisdom that the protections for interests in property being sold in § 363 would
be sufficient to meet foreseeable issues. Perhaps it was a combination of both.
The Qualitech decision was thus a catalyst to a more thorough analysis of
these issues.
101. The reference to my letter is not made to support an interpretation of
the section that differs from its otherwise plain meaning. The reference is
made simply to refute the contention that Congress intended something not
found in the clear language of the statute.
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D. Protection Under § 363
There are two kinds of protection under § 363 for holders of
interests adversely affected by a sale of property free and clear of
those interests. The first is § 363(0, which may be referred to as
the "gate keeper." Under that section, property may be sold free
and clear only if one of five prerequisites is met. The other is
§ 363(e), which mandates adequate protection when requested by
a party adversely affected by the sale free and clear.
1.

The Gate Keeper
As mentioned above, in order to sell the property free and
clear under § 363(0 the sale must meet at least one of the five
prerequisites set forth in that section. The court in Qualitech did
not discuss which prerequisite had been met, but stated that "the
parties before us do not dispute that at least one of those
conditions was satisfied." 102 We will review the five prerequisites
to see which may have applied in Qualitech, and which might
apply in the normal leasehold situation.
Section 363(f) provides as follows:
(f) The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) or (c) of this
section free and clear of any interest in such property of an entity
other than the estate, only if
(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property
free and clear of such interest;
(2) such entity consents;
(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such property is
to be sold is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on such
property;
(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or
(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable
proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction of such interest.
a.

Section 363(f)(1)
Assuming no agreement to the contrary, nonbankruptcy law
does not normally permit the sale of property free and clear of a
lease. Thus, a sale of the property in bankruptcy free and clear of
the lease would not be permitted on this ground. Given the
peculiar facts of Qualitech, however, it may have been possible
that this prerequisite was met for one of two reasons. First, the
tenant had failed to record its lease, leaving it subordinate to any

102. Qualitech, 327 F.3d at 546.
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subsequent bona fide purchaser from the landlord under
nonbankruptcy law. 10 3 On the date of the sale, however, the
10 4
tenant apparently had not "completely" vacated the premises.
Whether the tenant's activity at the premises was sufficient to put
a hypothetical purchaser from the landlord on inquiry notice is not
clear.1 05 If such inquiry notice existed, however, then the failure to

record would not, in itself, permit a hypothetical purchaser from
the owner to take free of the leasehold interest. This situation
could easily have been avoided by the lessee simply by recording
the lease.
The second reason this prerequisite might have applied in the
Qualitech situation is that there were mortgages on the fee prior to
the lease. Under foreclosure law, a foreclosure of the superior fee
mortgages could cut off the lease. Thus the sale free and clear
could have taken place. 10 6 In the normal situation the lease would
be of record and, as discussed above, the lease would not have been
entered into if there were prior mortgages on the fee. Therefore,
for the normal leasehold situation, this prerequisite should not
pose a problem, because, if the lease is senior, § 363(0(1) would not
be satisfied.
PRACTICE COMMENT: Given the prior discussion, it is hardly
necessary to state that the lease, or, where appropriate, a
memorandum thereof, must be recorded. Indeed the tenant should
obtain a title policy insuring its leasehold interest. The title report
will disclose if there are prior mortgages on the fee and, if so, the
tenant must request a subordination agreement under which the fee
mortgagee subordinates its interest in the fee to the interest of the
tenant. What this does is to switch the order of priority so that on
103. Under Indiana law, the lessee's failure to record will result in the
invalidity of the interest as against any person other than the grantor, the
grantor's heirs, or persons with notice of the lease. IND. CODE ANN. § 32-21-3-3
(West 2002). Under bankruptcy law the trustee has all the rights of a
hypothetical bona fide purchaser under state law as of the date of bankruptcy.
See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3). An unrecorded lease would be void as against such
a bona fide purchaser of the fee. See Annotation, Effect of Foreclosure of
Mortgage as Terminating Lease, 14 A.L.R. 664 (1921) [hereinafter Effect of
Foreclosure].
104. The Seventh Circuit stated: "By December 3, 1999, Precision had
completely vacated and padlocked the warehouse." Qualitech, 327 F.3d at 541.
The bankruptcy court had entered its sale order on August 13, 1999 and the
sale occurred on or about August 26.
105. The district court, having concluded that the notice to the tenant of the
sale was insufficient, remanded the case to the bankruptcy court to determine
whether Qualitech had inquiry notice of the unrecorded lease under state law
although it found evidence that Precision was in continuous possession
through the date of the sale. Qualitech, 2001 WL 699881, at *53, *64-65.
106. While a tenant might prevent a foreclosing mortgagee from cutting off
the lease by becoming the successful bidder at the foreclosure sale, § 363(f)(1)
applies if it is possible to sell free and clear of the lease under nonbankruptcy
law and that would seem to be the case here.
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foreclosure of the fee mortgage the purchaser at the sale would take
title subject to the lease. As a result, the existence of the mortgage
will not mean that the fee may be sold free and clear under
107
nonbankruptcy law.
An alternative to subordination often employed is a non-disturbance
and attornment agreement.
Under such an agreement the
mortgagee agrees that if it forecloses it will not join the tenant as a
party defendant in a judicial foreclosure sale and will recognize the
lease even in a power of sale jurisdiction where a junior lease may
be automatically terminated by the foreclosure. 108 In return the
tenant agrees to attorn to, or recognize, the mortgagee as its
landlord in the event of foreclosure.
This alternative is not
recommended to avoid the application of § 363(f)(1) because it leaves
the mortgage lien as prior to the lease and thus it is not clear that
the landlord's bankruptcy court would recognize the nondisturbance as preventing the lease from being cut off in foreclosure.
Rather, the non-disturbance might be considered only a contractual
arrangement between the fee mortgagee and the tenant, breach of
which might be actionable in damages. Furthermore, as discussed
above, if the non-disturbance agreement is considered to be an
executory contract, the agreement itself might be rejected in the
mortgagee's insolvency proceedings.
b.

Section 363(f)(2)

Under this exception, the gates to a sale free and clear will
open if the lessee consents to such a sale. Thus the tenant may
avoid subsection (f)(2) simply by not consenting to the sale.
Normally the tenant is not likely to give such consent, but this is
by no means assured. For example, if a tenant is losing money at
the location and its leasehold mortgage exceeds the value of the
leasehold estate, the tenant may not be motivated to object to a
sale free and clear. 109 While the statute only refers to "consent" to
the sale, cases have held that the failure to object will be
considered consent, 110 notwithstanding that Congress adverted to
107. Obtaining a subordination is often possible because it may be in the
best interest of the fee mortgagee to grant it. A good tenant will be paying the
rent that will pay the mortgage. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 85.
108. See, Effect of Foreclosure,supra note 103 at 676-78.
109. Those of us with a degree of paranoia may also fear a deal. For
example, if the tenant is a lessee in several of the debtor's properties, the
tenant may agree not to object to a sale free and clear in this property if the
landlord does not reject the lease in that property.
110. See FutureSource LLC v. Reuters Ltd., 312 F.3d 281, 285 (7th Cir.
2002) (holding that lack of objection, provided notice is proper, constitutes
consent); In re James, 203 B.R. 449, 453 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1997) (failure to
object is deemed implicit consent); Citicorp Homeowners Servs., Inc. v. Elliot
(In re Elliot), 94 B.R. 343, 345-46 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (failure to object after
receiving notice equals consent); In re Shary, 152 B.R. 724, 725-26 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1993). But see In re Roberts, Inc., 249 B.R. 152, 155 (Bankr. W.D.
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this question when the Code was being drafted and chose not to
provide for sale free and clear based on a failure to object.
Congress had two proposed pieces of legislation before it-the
Commission Bill,1' which provided for a sale free and clear when
11 2
which
the holder of the interest "consents," and the Judges' Bill,
the
chose
Congress
"consents."
added "or fails to object" to
Commission's approach.
The natural reaction of counsel to a leasehold mortgagee to
this prerequisite would be to add a clause to the leasehold
mortgage under which the tenant agrees to object to any proposed
sale free and clear of the lease, as well as a clause specifically
assigning to the leasehold mortgagee the tenant's right to object to
such a sale. The first question is whether a bankruptcy court will
enforce that agreement. Will a court, in a situation where the sale
free and clear will produce substantial sums for the estate, refuse
to accept a tenant's consent simply because the tenant has an
agreement under which it has abrogated its right to consent? It is
hoped that a court would honor the agreement and not leave the
mortgagee to a damage action against the tenant. But this is not
assured.
The main difficulty may be that the person that must be
assured there is no problem is the leasehold mortgagee. As we
have previously seen in connection with our discussion of the 1984
and 1994 amendments to § 365, leasehold mortgagees are not
easily assured. The similar situation under § 365(h) that gave rise
to those amendments involved the tenant's right to treat the lease
as terminated when the landlord is in bankruptcy and the lease is
rejected. Leasehold lenders had been unwilling to rely on a
bankruptcy court enforcing a provision in the mortgage under
which the tenant would agree not to elect to treat the lease as
terminated on rejection by the landlord's trustee, or under which
the tenant would assign its right to treat the lease as terminated
to the leasehold mortgagee. As a result, lenders fought hard for a
specific provision that would limit the tenant's right to treat the
lease as terminated to certain acceptable situations, including
agreements made with third parties permitting it.113 There is no
such provision in § 363(f)(2). Furthermore, even though leasehold
lenders were successful in obtaining reasonable protection in 1984,

Mich. 2000) (the term "consents" is not synonymous with "failure to object"
and must be unequivocal manifestation of affirmation). See also John Collen,
What Do the Subsections of Section 363(f) Really Mean? A Primer on Selling
Free and Clear of Interests, 6 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 563, 568-70 (1997),
(indicating that consent by failure to object is especially problematic where the
quality of notice is in question). See discussion supra note 75.
111. Commission Bill § 5-202(b).
112. Judge's Bill § 5-202(c).

113. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)(1)(A) (2000).
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the lenders, out of fear that the amendment did not go far enough,
requested another provision in 1994 which would define "tenant"
to include "mortgagee," and Congress responded.114
That
definition is limited by its terms to § 365(h)115 and would not apply
in § 363.
The absence of any provision in § 363(f)(2) similar to the
provisions found in § 365(h) has two adverse effects: It makes it
more likely that a court will not enforce an agreement in the
mortgage restricting consent, and it makes it more likely that
leasehold mortgagees will be unwilling to continue to make
leasehold investments without such assurance. Thus § 363(f)(2)
represents a serious concern to the leasehold mortgagee that the
fee may be sold free and clear of a lease under § 363(f)(2).
PRACTICE COMMENT: It does not appear that § 363(f)(2) can be

conclusively drafted around. Nevertheless it would be foolhardy not
to include in the mortgage a provision that the tenant/borrower
agrees to object to any purported sale in the landlord's bankruptcy
of the fee free and clear of the lease. Notwithstanding the
agreement to object, it may be desirable that the tenant/borrower
assign to the leasehold mortgagee any right it may nevertheless
have to consent or object to a sale free and clear.
c.

Section 363(f)(3)
This prerequisite deals with liens on the property. It does not
apply to leases and thus can not be the basis for a sale free and
clear of a lease. The subsection permits sale free and clear of liens
if the sale price is greater than the aggregate value of all liens on
the property. In essence, this would seem to require an upset price
equal to such value. The fact that the lienholder may credit bidl 16
at the sale under § 363(k), as will be discussed below, may obviate
the need for the upset price, 117 at least with respect to sales free
114. Id. § 365(h)(1)(D).
115. Section 365(h)(1)(D) begins: "In this paragraph ..
" Presumably this
means the entire subsection (h)(1). Cf. Frillz, Inc. v. Lader, 925 F. Supp. 83,
85-87 (D. Mass. 1996).
116. By "credit bid" we mean one in which the bidder may offset its claim
against any successful bid.
117. Under the Bankruptcy Act, there had been no provision authorizing a
sale free and clear of liens or interests in the debtor's property. As explained
by Professor MacLachlan, JAMES ANGELL MAcLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE

LAW OF BANKRUPTCY § 299 (1956), such a sale was nevertheless permitted as
part of the "clearly established" equitable power of the bankruptcy court,
citing, inter alia, Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U.S. 225, 227 (1931), in which
Justice Brandeis acknowledged that the
present Bankruptcy Act unlike the Act of 1867 [14 Stat. 517 §§ 1, 20]
contains no provision which in terms confers upon bankruptcy courts
the power to sell property of the bankrupt free from encumbrances. We
think it clear that the power was granted by implication. Like power
had long been exercised by federal courts sitting in equity when
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and clear of liens.118
Section 363(f)(4)
This subsection permits sale free and clear of an interest that
19
is in "bona fide" dispute. The Commission Bill' contained the
precursor to the present § 363(o, providing in its proposed § 5203(b) that property of the estate may be sold if the debtor has
equity in the property or if "the validity of the lien or other interest
encumbering the property is in dispute", and the property might
be sold free and clear of an interest if the holder of the interest
consents or is fully protected, and the lien attaches to the
proceeds. 120 It makes sense that if the validity of the interest is in
dispute, the resolution of that dispute should not delay the
settlement of the debtor's estate, especially since the interest, if
valid, would attach to the proceeds.
It was this proposal by the Commission that was the
foundation of the present § 363(o requirements. However, instead
of referring to the "validity" of the interest being in dispute,
§ 363(f)(4) refers simply to the interest being in dispute. This
fuzzy language raises some concern that a dispute arising in
connection with the interest, such as compliance with a particular
provision of a lease, might be considered a sufficient dispute to
permit sale free and clear. Fortunately, as pointed out by
Baxter 121 and Collen, 22 the standard most courts appear to have
set "for determining whether a 'bona fide dispute' exists is whether
there is an objective basis for either a factual or legal dispute as to
the validity of the asserted interest."
d.

ordering sales by receivers or on foreclosure.

Professor MacLachlan noted that the authorities insisted that the sale free
and clear should not be undertaken unless "the prospects of realizing a
surplus above the liens and costs of sale are favorable" although the courts
had authority and did confirm sales where "such prospects are not realized."
Railing against such a result, Professor MacLachlan urged the use of an upset
price, which was "well known in corporate reorganization receivership
practice." MACLACHLAN, §§ 351-52.
118. See discussion of § 363(e) and (k) below.
119. H.R. 31; S. 236.
120. H.R. Doc. No. 137 (1973).
121. Baxter, supra note 8, at 494 n.137 (citing In re Taylor, 198 B.R. 142, 162
(Bankr. D. S.C. 1996)). See also Richardson v. Pitt County (In re Stroud
Wholesale, Inc.), 47 B.R. 999, 1002 (E.D.N.C. 1985) ("[Section 363(f)(4)] is
merely a codification of long-standing law that allows property to be sold free
and clear of a lien if there is a dispute concerning the validity of that
lien.... There is nothing in the Code or in case law to suggest that (f)(4) would
justify a sale free and clear merely because there is a dispute as to the
distribution of the proceeds from the sale").
122. See Collen, supra note 110, at 574, where he indicates that § 363(f)(4) is
invoked "to establish that [a party's] ... interest is too controversial to
warrant protection" and that it is "the validity or existence of an interest that
must be in dispute."
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Notwithstanding the foregoing, some court decisions have
been nibbling at the edges of this conclusion. For example, in In re
Bedford Square Associates, 123 there was dispute as to whether an
unrecorded restrictive covenant in the lease was valid. While
there was no dispute as to whether the lease itself was valid, the
court allowed a sale of property free and clear of the restrictive
covenant in the lease. Other courts have found a bona fide dispute
even when the dispute is not the subject of an immediate or
concurrent adversary proceeding,124 or when the dispute is
between two third parties, neither of which is the debtor.125 When
dealing with most lease situations, however, the existence of the
lease is not in dispute and questions over the applicability of
§ 363(f)(4) are not likely to arise often. Nevertheless, when
amendments are made to correct some of the problems discussed
in this Article, it would be desirable to clear potential ambiguity
with more precise language and thereby avoid future litigation.
Suggested language is found in the Appendix.
e.

Section 363(f)(5)
Subsection (f)(5) is the most enigmatic of the prerequisites. It
permits a sale free and clear of an interest in the property if the
holder of the interest "could be compelled, in a legal or equitable
proceeding" to accept a "money satisfaction" of its interest. It
would seem clear that the proceeding referred to is a hypothetical
one that may encompass proceedings outside of the bankruptcy.126
Indeed, the language of § 363(f)(5) appears to compel that
understanding.
Thus, unless we adopt an alternative
interpretation of the meaning of the provision as discussed below,
we must conclude that if it is theoretically possible to require the
satisfaction of an interest on the payment of a sum of money 27
123. 247 B.R. 140 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000).
124. In re Oneida Lake Dev., Inc., 114 B.R. 352 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1990); In re
Collins, 180 B.R. 447 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995).

125. Scherer v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n (In re Terrace Chalet Apartments,

Ltd.), 159 B.R. 821 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
126. "I infer from the words 'could be compelled' that (f)(5) requires only that
the interest in question be subject to final satisfaction on a hypothetical basis,
not that there be an actual payment in satisfaction of the interest from the
proceeds of the sale in question." In re Healthco Int'l, Inc., 174 B.R. 174, 176
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1994). See WBQ P'ship. v. Virginia Dep't of Med. Assistance
Servs. (In re WBQ P'ship) 189 B.R. 97, 107 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995); Basil H.
Mattingly, Sale of Property of the Estate Free and Clear of Restrictions and
Covenants in Bankruptcy, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 431, 452 (1996) ("The
language of section 363(f)(5) only requires that it [the proceeding] be
theoretically possible.").
127. There is a line of cases holding that "satisfaction" means full
satisfaction (with a possible exception based on equitable considerations) out
of the proceeds of the sale. See, e.g., In re Wing, 63 B.R. 83, 85 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1986) (rejecting sale under (f)(5) because sale price was not enough to pay
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under any set of circumstances, the property may be sold under
this subsection free and clear of the interest, with the interest
attaching to the proceeds of the sale.
At first blush, it would not seem that this subsection would
permit sale of property free and clear of a lease since, normally,
the tenant may not be required to take money in exchange for the
lease. But as will be seen from the discussion that follows, as long
as we adhere to the proposition that § 363(f)(5) is referring to
hypothetical situations, it is possible that this subsection can be
the basis for a sale free and clear.
(i) Cramdown Under § 1129(b)(2)
One frequently cited basis for finding compliance with
subsection (f)(5) is that the holder of the interest cut off by the sale
could be compelled in a bankruptcy cramdown proceeding to accept
a money satisfaction. However, the application of § 363(f)(5) on
this basis is questionable. While it may be true that a holder of an
interest in property could be compelled to take a money
satisfaction in a cramdown, 128 it may not be as clear that a lease of
real property, which represents a conveyance as well as a contract
and thus an ownership interest in real estate, will be extinguished
in a Chapter 11 cramdown proceeding. 129 As discussed earlier, the
existence of an estate in the tenant was the basis for the protection
g anted to the tenant when the landlord rejects the lease. On the
other hand, a lease, like a mortgage or lien, is an interest in the
fee estate. 130 Just as the value of a property interest is protected
holders of liens in full.); In re Beker Indus. Corp., 63 B.R. at 478 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1986) (rejecting sale free and clear under (f)(5) if the property can be
sold for less than the aggregate amount of the liens); In re Stroud Wholesale,
47 B.R. at 1002 (stating that "money satisfaction" in liquidation as
distinguished from rehabilitation cases means full satisfaction or subsection
would swallow subsections (f)(1) to (f)(4)). These cases seem refuted by the
language of § 363(f)(5) and the fact that the result they suggest would make
§ 363(f)(5) duplicative, with respect to liens, of subsection (f)(3), which requires
full satisfaction. Many courts have held that § 363(f)(5) does not require a full
satisfaction of the interest. See, e.g., In re Terrace Chalet Apartments, 159
B.R. at 829-30; In re Grand Slam U.S.A., Inc. 178 B.R. 460, 462 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1995); In re Healthco, 174 B.R. at 177; Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Red Oak
Farms (In re Red Oak Farms, Inc.), 36 B.R. 856, 858 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1984).
128. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(C).
129. Professor Kuney questions whether a hypothetical cramdown can be the
basis for a free and clear sale under § 363(f)(5) as to a holder of a lien on the
property being sold since a lienholder has the ability to exercise the § 1111(b)
election and retain its full lien. George W. Kuney, MisinterpretingBankruptcy
Code Section 363(f) and Undermining the Chapter 11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 235, 252-53 (2002).
130. While a lease is clearly an interest in property, it may be possible that a
court could find that it is not an interest in property within the meaning of
§ 1129(b)(2)(C). For example, one U.S. Supreme Court decision found that a
right to foreclose a loan, certainly a property right, was not an "interest in
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in a cramdown by the Code131 as well as the Fifth Amendment to
the Constitution, it would also seem possible to impose a plan of
reorganization that would eliminate the lease as long as the value
of the interest is protected.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the notion that § 363(f)(5) can
be satisfied by the Bankruptcy Code itself makes little sense.
Theoretically everyone might be a debtor under the Code and a
proposed plan may be crammed down against those with claims or
interests in the property. More specifically, all sales free and clear
of leases under subsection (f) involve bankruptcy cases, and, if
they are Chapter 11 cases, there is always the possibility of a
cramdown. Thus it could be argued that every § 363 sale free and
clear in Chapter 11132 would meet the requirements of subsection

(f).
Of course it might be claimed that § 363(f)(5) should be
understood as limited to any legal or equitable proceeding other
than a proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code itself.133 However,
the language of subsection (f)(5) doesn't express this.
property" protected by § 362(d)(1). United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood
Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 365 (1988). Justice Scalia stated that statutory
construction "is a holistic endeavor" and that a provision that may seem
"ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder
of the statutory
scheme-because the same terminology is used elsewhere ... or because only
one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is
compatible with the rest of the law .. " Id. at 371. It would seem difficult to
argue, however, that § 1129(b)(2)(C) is ambiguous in isolation, which appears
to be the predicate for Justice Scalia's statement, although it may be rendered
ambiguous when looked at in the context of leases, practice and the language
of § 365.
131. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(C) (stating interests must, inter alia, retain
property of a value equal to the value of the interest); id. § 1129 (b)(2)(A) (liens
equal to the allowed amount of the claim may be retained with a present value
equal to the value of the collateral, unless, inter alia, the property is sold free
and clear of the lien with the lien attaching to the proceeds).
132. In Chapter 7, the lease would, like a lien, generally "ride through" the
bankruptcy (see Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 420 (1992), which may have
gone to extremes to preserve this concept) and would not be subject to a
provision similar to § 1129(b)(2) under which it could be compelled to take a
money satisfaction. But see In re James, 203 B.R. at 453-54 (finding that the
trustee's potential preference cause of action qualified as a legal or equitable
proceeding under § 363(f)(5)); In re Healthco, 174 B.R. at 177-78 (noting as an
alternative holding that sale free and clear of a tax lien may be permitted
because tax lien is subordinated to administrative expenses and other
specified claims under § 724(b) of the Bankruptcy Code).
133. This thought is discussed by Chief Judge Queenan in a case that
supports the proposition that a cramdown possibility is justification for a sale
free and clear under § 363(f)(5).
See In re Healthco, 174 B.R. at 176
("Subsection (f)(5) is nevertheless a bit of a conundrum.... [O]ne might
contend Congress could not have intended the subparagraph to be conditioned
on the existence of a remedy in the Bankruptcy Code which it necessarily
knew existed.
Also the reference to 'legal or equitable proceeding' is
admittedly a rather obtuse way of referring to a bankruptcy remedy.").
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Furthermore, § 363(f)(1) deals by its terms with rights under
"nonbankruptcy" law, but § 363(f)(5) has no such limitation, which
may lead to a conclusion that bankruptcy law is relevant in
(f)(5).134
As a result, it is not surprising there are many cases
supporting the application of § 363(f)(5) based on a theoretical
possibility of a cramdown, at least where a lien is involved. As an
example, in In re Terrace Chalet Apartments,135 an Ohio District
Court, in a well-reasoned opinion, found that a sale free and clear
under subsection (f)(5) may take place anytime "the trustee can
demonstrate the existence of another legal mechanism by which a
lien could be extinguished without full satisfaction of the secured
debt. Section 1129(b)(2) cramdown is such a provision." 136
Nevertheless, it is this author's conclusion that use of the
Bankruptcy Code to meet the requirements of a section of the
Bankruptcy Code is too much of a boot-strap argument to be a
correct interpretation of § 363(f)(5).
(ii) Eminent Domain
If the cramdown argument doesn't prevail, there is yet
another, and perhaps more promising, approach under which a
lessee may be compelled to accept a money satisfaction of its
interest-an eminent domain, or condemnation, 1 37 proceeding. In
condemnation, the government may take property for a public
Thus eminent
purpose on payment of just compensation.' 38
domain fits neatly into the general understanding of the meaning
of § 363(f) as a proceeding under which the holder of an interest in
property may be compelled to take a money satisfaction. It has an
advantage over the cramdown argument discussed above because
it is not based on rights created by other sections of the
139
Bankruptcy Code.
134. Id. at 177.
135. In re Terrace Chalet Apartments, 159 B.R. at 821. See In re WBQ
P'ship, 189 B.R. at 97 (finding that the proposed sale satisfies (f)(5) because in
a hypothetical cramdown proceeding, the holder of the interest could be
compelled to accept less than full payment); In re Healthco, 178 B.R. at 176
(cramdown proceeding complies with the description of proceedings in
subparagraph (f)(5)); Hunt Energy Co. v. United States (In re Hunt Energy
Co.), 48 B.R. 472, 485 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (sale free and clear permitted
where secured creditors could be compelled to accept money satisfaction in
cramdown); In re Red Oak Farms, 36 B.R. at 858 (subsection (f)(5)
requirement can be met by potential cramdown but holder of interest is
entitled to adequate protection).
136. In re Terrace Chalet Apartments, 159 B.R. at 829.
137. Eminent domain proceedings under state law are often referred to as
"condemnation" and we will sometimes use that term when referring to
eminent domain.
138. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
139. Professor Kuney notes that courts "forget to consider one proceeding in
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On the other hand, it has the disadvantage of being too good,
by half. Virtually all property, including properties of the state or
local governments, 140 may be subject to condemnation, under
which the holder can be required to accept a monetary
satisfactionl4l of its interest. If monetary compensation through a
theoretical condemnation proceeding were construed to meet the
requirements of the subsection, sale free and clear would be
available in almost every case, and render meaningless the first
four subsections of § 363(f). Courts may be hesitant to render a
decision that would seem to fly in the face of the normal canons of
statutory construction.
Nevertheless, it may be difficult to
42
overcome the language of the statute.
(iii) Other Situations Involving Foreclosure
There are many other situations where an entity may be
compelled to accept a money satisfaction of its interest. For
example, if a mortgage on the interest is foreclosed, the holder of
the interest will receive compensation out of the proceeds of the
sale after the mortgage and other interests and expenses of the
sale are satisfied. Because the holder of the interest is at the end
of the food line, it may not receive anything because the interest is
particular: one to obtain just compensation when there has been a
governmental taking under the power of eminent domain." In his outstanding
article on misinterpretation of § 363(f) in connection with in rem interests in
property, he urges the courts to "recognize the possibility of eminent domain
as a hypothetical proceeding that may satisfy the condition set out in
§ 363(f)(5). Doing so will focus the parties and the bankruptcy court on the
compensatory and Constitutionally mandated nature of adequate protection."
George W. Kuney, Further Misinterpretation of Bankruptcy Code Section
363(f): Elevating in Rem Interests and Promoting the Use of Property Law to
Bankruptcy-ProofReal Estate Developments, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 289, 310, 330
(2002).
140. See, e.g., United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 31 (1984)
(stating, inter alia, the words "private property" in the Takings Clause of the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution covers property of state and local
governments condemned by federal government). See generally Michael H.
Schill, Intergovernmental Takings and Just Compensation: A Question of
Federalism, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 829 (1989).
141. Some interests in property may not be compensable in condemnation
and thus would not seem covered by § 363(f)(5). For example, a minority of
jurisdictions find that some holders of restrictive covenants may not be
entitled to compensation for various reasons. See 2 NICHOLS ON EMINENT
DOMAIN, § 5.07[4][b] (3d ed. 2004).
142. See Mattingly, supra note 126, at 452. Professor Mattingly finds that
eminent domain actions may qualify as a sale free and clear under § 363(f)(1)
since it is applicable nonbankruptcy law that permits "sale" free and clear of
interests. Id. He states: "Opponents... may argue that the condemnation
argument proves too much, and makes section 363(f)'s alleged limitations
superfluous. In essence, the opponent would be saying the section doesn't
mean what it says. The trustee's response - maybe not, but it still says what
it says." Id.
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However, under the hypothetical application of
valueless.
it
is possible that the holder of the interest could be
§ 363(f)(5),
a money satisfaction by virtue of a foreclosure
to
accept
compelled
143
or a fee mortgage prior to the lease.
mortgage
leasehold
of a
Similarly, if a tax lien is foreclosed on property, the owner of
the property will be compelled to accept a money satisfaction from
the proceeds of the sale after the lien is satisfied. Thus the
hypothetical foreclosure of a tax lien on the lease, or a real estate
tax lien on the fee (normally first priority) can result in the
invocation of § 363(f)(5) to permit a sale free and clear of the lease.
The same is true for the potential foreclosure of a judgment lien
The
docketed in the county where the property is located.
application of § 363(f)(5) in these situations is so all-inclusive that
the gate to sale free and clear may be permanently open.
f.

Is the Gate Open?

Will § 363(f) enable a trustee for a landlord in bankruptcy to
sell the fee interest free and clear of a lease? From the foregoing
discussion, it would seem that there is a substantial risk that such
a sale will be permitted. Since § 363(f)(1) can be handled with
reasonable due diligence, (f)(3) is inapplicable, and (f)(4) is not
likely to be a problem in most situations, the real risks appear to
revolve around subsections (f)(2) and (f)(5)-consent and right to
require a monetary satisfaction-where there is a real risk the gate
will open to allow a sale free and clear. In both situations, the risk
would not seem to be susceptible to being drafted around
successfully. 144 Section 363(f)(5) almost appears to permit sale

143. "[F]oreclosure sales are commonly recognized hypothetical proceedings
that can satisfy § 363(f)(5)." Kuney, supra note 129, at 251-52. It can be
argued, however, that the tenant can not be compelled to accept the money
satisfaction in a foreclosure situation because it has the alternative of paying
the debt by exercising the equity of redemption." However, § 363(f)(5) would
seem to apply to any situation where money satisfaction could be compelled
including the tenant's inability to redeem by paying the debt.
144. But see Baxter, supra note 8 (who, notwithstanding his concern about
the Qualitech decision, seems to believe that the § 363(f) gate will open only in
rare situations). In discussing § 363(e), which purports to afford adequate
protection to an entity with an interest in the property being sold, Baxter
states: "At the outset, it must be noted that adequate protection under § 363(e)
applies only if the debtor has the right to sell the property under § 363. As
discussed later, it will be rare for the debtor to have the right to sell free and
clear of a lease. Therefore, adequate protection will almost never be
applicable." Id. at 491. I take this language as not arguing that § 363(e) is
ineffective to protect holders of interests when property is sold free and clear
on the ground that there are few cases where property is sold free and clear.
Rather, I assume that the statement is meant to say that although Qualitech
can be a problem for investors in leases, sales free and clear will not occur very
often. If true, this is all to the good. However as indicated herein, that
conclusion may be somewhat optimistic.
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free and clear all the time. That conclusion, however, is based on
the common wisdom that § 363(f)(5) applies to any theoretical
possibility under which a money satisfaction can be compelled.
Because this interpretation of the section makes one wonder why
Congress bothered to place any prerequisites on sale free and
clear, it is suggested that perhaps an alternative interpretation to
the theoretical application of the section might be considered.
Under that alternative, the section would apply only to an actual
right the debtor might have to force the holder of the interest in
the property the debtor wishes to sell to accept a money
satisfaction. Unfortunately the language of the section does not
appear to permit this interpretation, which is further evidence
that § 363 in general, and § 363(f) in particular, is sorely in need of
amendment. A proposed amendment is found in the Appendix.
For the present, however, the prospective leasehold investor
must assume that the gate will open to permit sale free and clear
of leases and consider what the consequences of such a sale would
be. The fact that a sale free and clear may be permitted, however,
should not alone result in a decision not to make leasehold
investments if the leasehold investor is protected when such a sale
takes place. In Qualitech, the Seventh Circuit took pains to
emphasize that protection was available through the application of
§ 363(e), which mandates that on request of an entity that has an
interest in the property being sold, the court "shall prohibit or
condition" the sale to provide adequate protection for that
interest.145 If the adequate protection does in fact protect the
interest of the entity, real estate people should have no cause to
complain. The next section of this Article will explore the extent
to which adequate protection protects a tenant or leasehold
mortgagee when, in a landlord's bankruptcy, the property is sold
free and clear of the lease.
2. Adequate Protection Under § 363(e)
Section 363's protection is embodied in subsection (e), which
requires adequate protection on request of an entity that holds an
interest in the property sold. However, § 363(e) may not be as
protective for the tenant and leasehold mortgagee as one might at
first think.
a.

Requesting Adequate Protection
At the outset, it should be clear that the leasehold mortgagee,
as such, 146 does not hold an interest in the fee that is being sold.

145. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e).
146. The words "as such" are used because leasehold mortgagees sometimes
can get the landlord to agree to encumber the fee interest with the lien of the
leasehold mortgage (a technique that is often colloquially and incorrectly
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Rather, its interest is in the lease. Therefore, the leasehold
mortgagee is not eligible for adequate protection under § 363(e).
The tenant, however, does hold an interest in the fee since its
rights are carved out of the bundle of rights that comprises the
Thus, the leasehold mortgagee's
landlord's fee interest.'4 7
protection is derivative from the tenant. This presents problems
similar to those discussed above in connection with the tenant's
election to treat the lease as terminated under § 365(h) 148 and the
tenant's ability to "consent" to a sale free and clear under
In the former situation, the matter has been
§ 363(f)(2). 149
corrected by statutory amendment, and in the latter, it has not.
The first § 363(e) problem for the leasehold mortgagee, then,
is to insure that the tenant will request adequate protection. As
we have seen in Qualitech, if adequate protection is not asked for,
it will not be granted. While one would normally think that the
tenant would always ask for adequate protection if the fee is being
sold free and clear of the lease, this is by no means certain. As
discussed above, as a possible explanation for the failure to ask for
adequate protection in Qualitech,150 a lease may be valueless to
the tenant even when it is not valueless to a leasehold mortgagee.
In Qualitech, the lease was presumptively valueless because prior
mortgages on the fee exceeded the value of the property including
the lease (although as previously pointed out prior mortgages on
the fee could be present only if the tenant or leasehold mortgagee
were willing to make what can be considered an imprudent
investment). The lease can also be valueless in the normal
prudent leasehold mortgage situation, but for other reasons. The
lease can become valueless due to a deterioration in the real estate
market that results in a reduction in the value of the fee and lease,
Where the
making the leasehold mortgagee undersecured.
leasehold mortgage exceeds the value of the leasehold, there may
be little motivation for the tenant to fight for adequate protection,
especially if there were no love lost between the tenant and the
leasehold mortgagee.
Certainly the mortgage may provide that the tenant must
request adequate protection if the fee is being sold free and clear of
the lease or the tenant may assign its right to ask for adequate
protection to the leasehold mortgagee. However, as we have seen
referred to as "subordinating the fee").

See discussion of this technique in

Section II.D.2.d, infra.
147. The bundle of rights theory stems from the spiritual leader of Property
Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some
professors, Professor Wesley N. Hohfeld.
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE
L.J. 16 (1913); Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied
in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917).
148. See discussion in Part I.B.
149. See discussion supra in Part II.D.l.(b).
150. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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in other similar situations, there is no assurance that such
provisions will be enforced. What is needed is an amendment to
§ 363(e) similar to the 1994 Amendment to § 365(h),151 which, in
this situation, would provide that adequate protection under
§ 363(e) may be requested by any entity with an interest in the
property of an entity that is the subject of a free and clear sale. 152
Anything short of that, it is feared, will not satisfy prospective
leasehold mortgagees.
b. Will Adequate Protection Be Available if the Lease Is
Valueless?
Even if the tenant requests adequate protection, will it be
available when the lease is valueless to the tenant? There are at
least three situations where the leasehold may be valueless to the
tenant. First, where there are prior interests in the fee that
exceed the value of the property as we saw in Qualitech and
discussed above, where the prior mortgages would have consumed
the fee along with the lease, whether the lease were rejected or
sold. Thus, there would be little or no value for § 363(e) to protect.
However, this result mirrors what would occur under
nonbankruptcy law and can easily be avoided as discussed above.
The second situation is where the leasehold mortgagee is
undersecured, that is, where the value of the lease has fallen
below the amount of the leasehold mortgage. In this situation,
while the lease may have no value to the tenant, it may still have
sufficient value to collateralize all or a significant portion of the
leasehold mortgagee's investment. Such a lease should be subject
to protection under § 365(h) on rejection in the landlord's
bankruptcy and, if the fee is sold free and clear under § 363(f),
adequate protection should be available-if, as discussed above,
there were someone who could and would ask for it.
The third situation is where the lease is valueless both to the
tenant and the leasehold mortgagee based on such economic
conditions as where the rental is substantially above market and
rents from subtenants, if any, do not equal the tenant's expenses.
Thus the leasehold estate would be difficult to sell at any price. In
this situation it is possible that § 365(h) would afford protection to
the leasehold mortgagee and § 363(e) would not. Since the lease
has no economic value, adequate protection might not be available
under § 363.
However, if the landlord rejects the lease
(improbable if the rent is well above market), the tenant still has
the option under § 365(h)(1)(A)(ii) to retain its rights under the
lease as long as it is willing to continue to pay the above market
rent.
Because of the amendments designed to protect the

151. See supra Part I.C.
152. Suggested language may be found in the Appendix.
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leasehold mortgagee of 1984 and 1994 discussed above, the
to
leasehold mortgagee has the power to compel the tenant 15
3
terminated.
as
lease
the
treating
of
instead
option
exercise that
Thus, this is an area where the leasehold mortgagee might be
better protected when the lease has no value if § 365(h) protections
applied.
From the foregoing discussion, it would seem that if the
leasehold mortgagee can manage to get the tenant to request
If adequate
adequate protection, § 363(e) will be available.
extent of
the
is
what
is
question
next
the
protection is available,
offers.
363
§
that
protection
the
c.

Credit Bidding and § 363(k)

What makes § 363(e) troubling for the leasehold mortgagee is
that neither the lessee nor the leasehold mortgagee has the ability
to "credit bid" at the sale of the property since § 363(k) authorizes
154
the credit bid only for holders of liens securing an allowed claim,
15 5
Under credit bidding, the holder of the
and a lease is not a lien.
153. The motivation for this insistence on the part of the leasehold

mortgagee may be an expectation that even if the leasehold is valueless at the
time, changed economic conditions in the future might afford at least some
value to protect the leasehold mortgagee.
154. Section 363(k) reads as follows: "At a sale under subsection (b) of this
section [sales outside the normal course of business] of property that is subject
to a lien that secures an allowed claim, unless the court for cause orders
otherwise the holder of such claim may bid at such sale, and, if the holder of
such claim purchases such property, such holder may offset such claim against
the purchase price of such property."
155. Professor Mattingly makes an interesting argument that a restrictive
covenant could be considered a lien within the § 101(37) Bankruptcy Code
definition of a lien as a "charge against or interest in property to secure
payment of a debt or performance of an obligation." He argues that a use
restriction on property would be a lien because the beneficiaries of the use
restriction would be holding an interest in the property burdened by the
restriction, and the interest would secure the obligation of the owner of the
burdened property to comply with the restriction. Mattingly, supra, note 126,
at 431. If correct, this reasoning might be considered applicable to leases as
well, on the somewhat circuitous reasoning that a lease is an interest in the
landlord's property that "secures" the performance of obligations of the
It would seem doubtful, however, that this
landlord under the lease.
reasoning will prevail. It requires an interpretation of the words "to secure" as
meaning something like "to insure compliance" or "to make it likely that",
rather than its traditional meaning, "as security for", in the sense of a security
interest. Indeed the language of the Bankruptcy Code definition of lien
appears to have its origins in § 1-201(35) of the Uniform Commercial Code
definition of "security interest" as an "interest ...which secures payment or
performance of an obligation." U.C.C. § 1-201(35) (2004). Furthermore, it is
difficult to see the Mattingly understanding of the meaning of "lien" applied to
leases, especially since the UCC definition of security interest as an interest in
property securing an obligation in § 1-201(35) goes on at length to distinguish
leases from security interests except in certain circumstances when a lease

144
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lien may bid at the sale and if that holder is the successful bidder,
the holder may offset against its bid the amount of its claim. This
is similar to the procedure we normally see in foreclosure sales. It
is not clear why § 363(k) refers only to liens. Section 363(k) had
been inserted at the urging of the ACLI, which suggested an
amendment providing that "an entity that has an interest in the
property proposed to be sold by the trustee may bid at the sale
thereof and set off against the purchase price thereof up to the
amount of such entity's claim."156 This broad language was
incorporated in the Committee Report, which stated that "any
holder of any interest in the property being sold will be permitted
to bid... ."157
For unexplained reasons, when § 363(k) was
written, it referred only to the holder of a lien. 158
Credit bidding is important because the Qualitech court
makes reference to the fact that adequate protection is obtained
"typically from the proceeds of the sale." 159 The Committee Report
contains similar language.160 This produces real concern that the
sale price might set the value of the property for the purposes of
adequate protectionl6l under circumstances where the holder
of
the interest cannot protect itself through the bidding process.
Like

might be considered intended as security.
156. See Letter from John J. Creedon, then Executive Vice
President of
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company and Chair of the ACLI's
Subcommittee
on Federal Bankruptcy Legislation, to Congressman Don
Edwards, the
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, the subcommittee then
responsible for
bankruptcy legislation (Mar. 18, 1977) (on file with the St. John's
University
School of Law, Bankruptcy Legislative History Collection) (emphasis
added).
While Mr. Creedon's concern was with the rights of the mortgagee
(he urged
that a provision be added to the bankruptcy bill, then H.R. 6, to
make it clear
that "if the trustee in bankruptcy sells mortgaged property, the
mortgagee can
bid at the sale and credit against the bid an amount of to the
amount of the
mortgage debt" [recommendation 3]), his proposed statutory language
clearly
was much broader.
157. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 345.
158. Collier hints that in appropriate circumstances a court might,
perhaps
using its equity powers, permit a holder of an interest to bid and
offset. "Since
subsection (k) is simply declarative of existing law and practice,
there appears
no good reason why the holder of any interest might not bid and
offset as long
as the interest is one capable of reduction to a money satisfaction
which would
be allowed as a secured claim and is not one which is governed
by subsection
(g) or (h), where an offset would be improper and a different remedy
is offered
in subsection (i)." 3 COLLIER ON BANKRuPTcY
363.09 (15th ed. rev. 2004).
Such an authorization, however, would necessitate the valuation
of the
leasehold estate before the sale, which the courts may not be inclined
to do.
159. Qualitech, 327 F.3d at 548.
160. In its discussion of § 363(f) the Committee states
"[miost often,
adequate protection in connection with a sale free and clear of
other interests
will be to have those interests attach to the proceeds of the sale."
See H.R.
REP. No. 95-595, at 345.
161. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 8, at 14.
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any mortgagee at a foreclosure sale, if there is competitive bidding,
the holder of an interest in the property must bid to make sure
that the price at which the property is sold will equal the debt and
162
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Thus the ability of the lessee to protect itself through the sale
process is not assured. Nevertheless, adequate protection requires
that the court compensate the lessee for the value of its interest in
the property. It does not require that the only method of providing
162. Interestingly, § 363(k) provides that any lienholder may credit bid.
Suppose, for example, there were two mortgages on a property being sold. The
first mortgage has been paid down to $100 and the second has a balance of
$1,000. Suppose the second mortgagee bids $150 at the sale and is the
successful bidder. One would expect that $100 of the proceeds would be used
to satisfy the first mortgagee's claim and the second mortgagee could offset the
remaining $50 against its bid. However, the language of § 363(k) seems to
allow the second mortgagee to offset its entire claim against the bid, which
would have the effect of wiping out the first mortgagee. Such a result seems
contrary to policy, was certainly not intended, and may have serious
constitutional problems. It is therefore unlikely that the section will be so
strictly applied. In a similar situation, the court came to the correct result,
but for the wrong reasons. In re Valley Bldg. Supply, Inc, 39 B.R. 131 (Bankr.
D. Vt. 1984). The court chose to evaluate the language of the statute based on
an incomplete reading of the legislative history. It quoted the language of the
Committee Report that states the successful bidder may "offset the value of
his interest against the purchase price of the property." Id. at 132-33. From
this it was reasoned that the words "offset such claim against the purchase
price" in the statute meant that the purchaser could offset only the "value" of
the claim. Id. at 131 (emphasis added). Since there was no equity in the
property over the first mortgages, the interest had no value against which a
bid might be offset, the court held. What was wrong was that the quoted
language from the Committee Report was the result of the statement in the
Report in line with the ACLI suggestion (see supra text accompanying note
156) that any holder of an interest could bid. Since interests that are not liens
may have a value but not an amount, it was natural to refer to offsetting the
value of the interest. However, the language of the statute (permitting only
holders of liens to offset) did not conform to the language of the Committee
Report and so could not be cited in this context. Undoubtedly this is where the
"unless the court for cause orders otherwise" language in the section might
have come in to play. The ambiguity would be resolved by the specific
language in § 363(k) suggested in the Appendix.
163. It should be kept in mind that what is being purchased here is the fee
interest. Thus the lessee or leasehold mortgagee, if they could bid, would be
bidding for the larger interest, which may involve substantial sums of money.
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adequate protection is to attach the interest to the proceeds of the
sale. If value can be shown to be greater than the sale price, it
should be recognized.16 4 Even if a court were inclined to recognize
the need for adequate protection based on value, not the sale price,
the difficulty is that the adequate protection to be afforded will be
based on the value of the leasehold. Valuing a lease is not an
impossible task, as leaseholds are valued every day especially in
connection with condemnation proceedings. It is, however, a
complex and time-consuming process, 165 requiring the court to
value the leasehold to determine how much of the sale price should
be distributed to the lessee.
In the drafting stages, Congress had considered an
amendment to proposed § 363(k) that would provide that property
could not be sold free and clear for less than a predetermined
upset price which would be sufficient to satisfy all interests in the
property,1 66 a proposal that did not become part of the statute. It
had long been the general rule that property should not be sold
free and clear unless the court is completely satisfied that the
proceeds will be sufficient to satisfy interests in the property. 67

164. This approach is taken in statutes limiting the amount of deficiency
judgments after foreclosure sales. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAw
§ 1371 (McKinney 1979), which provides that a mortgagee seeking a deficiency
judgment must prove the market value of the property and the deficiency
judgment will be limited to the amount of the debt less that value or the
foreclosure sale price, whichever is higher. Note, however, that legislation
was required in order to achieve that equitable result.
165. See, e.g., James Cooper, Lease Interest Valuations, APPRAISAL AND
VALUATION MANUAL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF APPRAISERS 71 (1960);
Edward T. Matheny, Leasehold Interests, 27 APPRAISAL J. OF THE AM. INST. OF
REAL EST. APPRAISERS, 375 (1959).

166. In testimony on the original Commission and Judge's Bills (see
discussion supra at note 37 and accompanying text), John J. Creedon, on
behalf of the ACLI, urged that provision be made that property could not be
sold free and clear for "less than an upset price which will produce moneys
sufficient to satisfy the liens after paying prior administrative expenses
chargeable to the sale and other priority claims." Bankruptcy Act Revision:
Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Civil and
ConstitutionalRights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1601 (1976).
See also Letter from John J. Creedon to Senator Dennis DeConcini, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Improvements in the Judicial Machinery, Committee on the
Judiciary, United States Senate (undated) (on file with the St. John's
University, School of Law Bankruptcy Legislative History Collection)
(proposing specific statutory language as follows: "Notwithstanding any other
provision of this section the trustee may sell property free and clear of any
interest in such property of an entity other than the estate at not less than a
fair upset price ....). Unfortunately, Congress did not adopt this suggestion,
apparently thinking that the concern was addressed adequately when the
ACLI proposed credit bidding provision was inserted as § 363(k).
167. See, e.g., MACLACHLAN, supra note 117 ("The authorities are clear to
the effect that the power [to sell free and clear] should not be exercised unless
the prospects of realizing a surplus above the liens and costs of sale are

20041

The Sad History of § 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code

Given the difficulties in protecting interests ih the lease under
§ 363(e) and § 363(k), this proposal should be seriously considered
See the
in drafting amendments to the Bankruptcy Code.
(k).
and
363(f)
§
proposed amendments in the Appendix to
d.

Encumbering the Fee

A word should be said about a technique that is often
employed under which the landlord agrees to encumber its fee
interest with the lien of the leasehold mortgage. 168 This would
result in converting a leasehold mortgage into a fee and leasehold
mortgage. Once the leasehold mortgage encumbers the fee, it
would be a lien on and interest in the fee estate and thus would
have the effect of alleviating both the problem of objecting to a sale
free and clear and asking for adequate protection. It would also
seem that the leasehold mortgagee should then be entitled to a
credit bid at the sale of the fee free and clear of the lease since it is
now an interest in the fee that would be secured by an allowed
claim.169
The problem is that encumbering the fee is not just a drafting
technique. It is also a matter for hard negotiation. When the
lease is being negotiated, the fee owner may be willing to
encumber the fee with a leasehold mortgage if the tenant is one
the landlord wants and the lease could not be closed without such
an agreement. On the other hand, after the lease has been
executed it may be difficult to get the landlord to agree to such an
encumbrance on its interest unless there is a substantial payment
favorable."); Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearing on S. 235 and S. 236, 94th
Cong. (1976) (testimony of Louis Levit, then President of the Commercial Law
League of America) ("A court should not order a property sold free and clear of
liens unless there is some reasonable basis to believe that general creditors
will ultimately receive an equity, either because the valuation appears to be
greater than the amount of liens or because one or more of the liens is in
dispute.").
168. This technique is probably better known in jargon as "subordinating the
fee." Of course, since there is no logical way that a fee interest can be
subordinated to a leasehold mortgage; the jargon is not accurate. See JAMES L.
LIPSCOMB, STRUCTURING COMPLEX REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 8.1(a), at
134 (1988) ('There are some who errantly refer to this encumbrance of the fee
as a 'subordinated fee'. However, since a fee is absolute and cannot be
subordinated, the encumbrance of the owner's fee interest should be referred
to as an 'encumbered fee.' The encumbrance is in actuality the encumbrance
of two estates with one lien."). Note, however, that it is possible that the lien
of the leasehold mortgage on the fee may be subordinate to prior interests in
the fee even if the prior interests in the fee have subordinated to the lease.
169. Encumbering the fee is discussed in Charles C. Smith & Harold A.
Lubell, Real Estate Financing: The Streamlined Mortgage, 4 REAL EST. REV.
21 (1973). The article is reprinted and discussed in STEVEN BENDER, CELESTE
HAMMOND, MICHAEL MADISON AND ROBERT ZINMAN, MODERN REAL ESTATE
FINANCE AND LAND TRANSFER - A TRANSACTIONAL APPROACH 562-68 (3d ed.
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to the landlord or the lease will provide important benefits to the
landlord's estate. Negotiation to get the landlord to so encumber
its interest would, in this situation, be solely bankruptcy
motivated. A failure of the negotiation may result in the failure to
lease the premises or may prevent the tenant from expanding its
existing premises, with consequent adverse impact on the jobs and
production that such expansion would produce. It is again another
example of a bankruptcy tail wagging the real estate industry dog,
simply because the language of the statute is unclear.
PRACTICE COMMENT: Even though it may not be possible to
encumber the fee with the interest of the leasehold mortgage, it is
strongly recommended that tenants and potential leasehold
mortgagees make obtaining such an encumbrance a number-one
priority and that leasehold mortgagees condition any commitment
on the fee owner's agreement to allow this.
e. Why Adequate Protection Under § 363(e) May Not Assuage the
Concern of the Leasehold Mortgagee
In determining whether adequate protection under § 363(e) is
adequate, we must ask ourselves: Adequate for whom? For the
purposes of this Article, it must be adequate to warm sufficiently
the potential cold feet of leasehold investors. Unfortunately, it
may not be. From the standpoint of the leasehold mortgage, the
sine qua non of leasehold investments, adequate protection under
§ 363(e) may not provide the kind of confidence in the security for
the loan that these lenders would normally expect. The danger is
that, like the situation that arose in 1994,170 a few bad decisions,
even by lower courts, could result in a cut-off of leasehold
financing until the questions are authoritatively resolved. The
only really effective way to protect the tenant and leasehold
mortgagee when the landlord attempts to sell the property free
and clear of the lease is through corrective legislation.
This corrective legislation can be accomplished by technical
changes to § 363 to eliminate the ambiguities contained in the
prerequisites and to permit sale free and clear only if an upset
price would ensure full compensation of the interests being cut off;
§ 363(e) to provide that adequate protection is not limited by the
sale price and is available to the leasehold mortgagee; and § 363(k)
to provide that the holder of any interest in the property sold can
bid and offset and providing for valuation of the lease by the court.
In light of the additional problems discussed below in connection
with the tenant's bankruptcy, however, it is recommended that
Congress be urged, not only to correct the defects in § 363, but also
to return to the original intent of the drafters of the Bankruptcy
Code by making a sale free and clear of a lease outside the
170. See supraPart I.C.
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ordinary course of business under § 363(b) and (f) subject to the
protections for tenants and landlords built into § 365. These
suggested amendments to the Bankruptcy Code are found in the
Appendix to this Article.
III.

THE RIPPLE EFFECT OF QUALITECH: SECTIONS
IN THE TENANT'S BANKRUPTCY.

363

AND

365

It seems clear from the foregoing discussion of the problems
involved in attempting to protect the tenant under § 363 that an
amendment to the Bankruptcy Code is necessary to preserve
leasehold investments in the face of the risks uncovered as a result
of the Qualitech decision. The effects of Qualitech, however, may
go beyond its fact situation and have a ripple effect that may spill
over to other areas. One such area is the tenant's bankruptcy.
A. Sale of a Lease by the Tenant in Bankruptcy
Consider this hypothetical situation: A shopping center
tenant in Chapter 11 negotiates a sale of its leasehold to an
assignee that could not meet the financial condition and other
requirements of § 365 (b)(3) and (f).171 The shopping center is
"high fashion." The proposed assignee is a discount operation.
The nature of the proposed assignee's business will seriously and
adversely affect the tenant mix and balance in the shopping center
and would breach restrictive covenants contained in many of the
Furthermore, the assignee's
leases in the shopping center.
condition do not meet the
financial
and
operating performance
violation of § 365(b)(3)(C)
in
are
and
requirements of § 365(b)(3)(A)
for the tenant to
impossible
it
is
Thus
365(f).
as
§
and (D), as well
give the required adequate assurance of future performance.
Given the inability to assign this lease under § 365, the tenant has
proposed to sell the lease under § 363(b), as a sale outside the
ordinary course of business of the debtor, where the requirements
of § 365 are not present. 172 Would the tenant be able to sell the
lease under § 363 to the assignee that would not qualify under
§ 365?
This is no mere academic issue. Any landlord is concerned
about who the tenant in the premises will be. A high quality
tenant can improve the reputation of a building and make it easier
to lease to other high quality tenants or to high quality wannabes.
A low quality tenant can do just the opposite. A shopping center
developer is especially conscious of the need to create a certain

171. The text of these provisions is found infra in note 178.
172. Although the hypothetical deals with a shopping center situation, the
problem is not limited thereto. For example, § 365(b)(1)(C) requires that any
tenant assuming a lease must provide adequate assurance of future
performance. There is no such requirement with respect to a sale under § 363.
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ambiance to attract tenants for whom tenant mix is an important
factor in a decision to lease. An "adult" bookstore, or a discount
operation, in a high fashion shopping center can adversely affect
future rentals. The bookstore, the discount operation, or even an
additional shoe store, may violate restrictive covenants in
shopping centers dealing with radius or location requirements,
limitations on use, and exclusivity rights that "anchor" tenants
have demanded as a condition to leasing.
In Qualitech, the Seventh Circuit held that a landlord in
bankruptcy may act under § 365 or § 363. If this is also true for
the tenant in bankruptcy, there may be severe consequences for
the landlord, especially the landlord in a shopping center, and for
the ability to finance leasehold estates and shopping centers.
In discussing this issue, we will first look at § 365 and the
protections for the landlord on the tenant's bankruptcy found in
§ 365. Next, we will explore whether the Qualitech principles
could be applied to the tenant's bankruptcy situation. Finally, we
will review the questions that such application would raise, and
the effect of those questions on leasehold investments.
B. The Draftingof § 365(b), (c), and (f)
Just as Congress showed its concern for safeguarding the
tenant's rights in a lease by the writing of, and amendments to
§ 365(h), it also took pains to protect the bargain of the landlord
when the tenant is in bankruptcy. In addition, special attention
was given to the consequences of a tenant's bankruptcy on the
terms of leases in shopping centers. 173 The provisions dealing with
shopping centers are largely the result of efforts on the part of the
International Council of Shopping Centers ("ICSC"), which was
extremely effective in protecting the position of its members. 174
The result was the singling out of this one segment of the real
estate industry for special provisions relating only to leases in
shopping centers. The provisions were based on a belief that the
carefully planned and balanced nature of shopping centers should
not be adversely affected by a tenant's bankruptcy. 175
173. The term "shopping center" is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code.
However, in In re Joshua Slocum Ltd., 922 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1990), the court
listed twelve factors to be considered in determining whether property
qualifies as a shopping center. Id. at 1087. Calling for a strict construction of
the term and commenting on those factors listed in Slocum, Collier's 3
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 365.05, believes those likely determinative would
be "a combination of leases held by a single landlord leased to commercial
retail distributors of goods, with the presence of a common parking area."
174. See Bruce H. Roswick & Stephanie McEvily, Use Clauses in Shopping
Center Leases: The Effect of the Tenant's Bankruptcy, 14 REAL EST. L.J. 3, 25
(1985) (stating that ICSC was instrumental in obtaining special protections).
175. As explained in H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 348-49,
[A] shopping center is often a carefully planned enterprise, and though
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The reasons for the concern of landlords in general, and
shopping center developers in particular, were certain changes the
Bankruptcy Code made in prior law. Under the Bankruptcy Act, a
clause in a lease that terminated the lease on the bankruptcy of
the tenant was enforceable, which meant that landlords did not
have to be concerned about the rights of tenants to assign after the
commencement of the tenant's bankruptcy. 176 These ipso facto
clauses in leases were rendered unenforceable under § 365(e) of
the Bankruptcy Code. 177 At the same time, the Bankruptcy Code
provided in § 365 that tenants could assign leases in bankruptcy
notwithstanding provisions of the leases restricting such
assignments. As a result of these changes, landlords lost a great
deal of control over the tenants in the property. Congress seemed
to understand that this freedom on the part of tenants, and
seeming impotency on the part of landlords to restrict that
freedom, could result in hardship for the landlord, whether or not
the tenant was part of a shopping center.
As a result, Congress inserted provisions in § 365 designed to
preserve the bargain of the landlord while permitting the tenant to

it consists of numerous individual tenants, the center is planned as a
single unit, often subject to a master lease or financing agreement.
Under these agreements, the tenant mix in a shopping center may be as
important to the lessor as the actual promised rental payments, because
certain mixes will attract higher patronage of the stores in the center,
and thus a higher rental for the landlord from those stores that are
subject to a percentage of gross receipts rental agreement. Thus, in
order to assure a landlord of his bargained for exchange, the court would
have to consider such factors as the nature of the business to be
conducted by the trustee or his assignee, whether that business complies
with the requirements of any master agreement .... and whether the
business proposed to be conducted would result in a breach of other
clauses in master agreements relating, for example, to tenant mix or
location.
176. Section 70(b) of the Bankruptcy Act provided that "an express covenant
that.., the bankruptcy of a specified party.., shall terminate the lease or
give the other party an election to terminate the same shall be enforceable."
However, this language was often honored in the breach. See, e.g., Smith v.
Hoboken R.R., Warehouse & S.S. Connecting Co., 328 U.S. 123, 128-29 (1946)
(asserting the I.C.C. should determine whether the provision allowing
termination was applicable in railroad reorganization); Queens Boulevard
Wine & Liquor Corp. v. Blum, 503 F.2d 202, 207 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding the
termination barred as grossly inequitable and contrary to the provisions of
Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act); In re Fleetwood Motel Corp., 335 F.2d 857,
862 (3d Cir. 1964) (explaining that termination would not be enforced in
reorganization proceeding where a landlord would take over the tenant's only
property). Nevertheless the provision did give the landlord leverage in the
negotiating process.
177. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e). See generally Jeffrey S. Battershall, Commercial
Leases and Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 329
(1990).
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assign in appropriate circumstances. 178 These provisions required
178. The following excerpts from § 365 illustrates these protections:

(b)
(1) If there has been a default in an executory contract or unexpired
lease of the debtor, the trustee may not assume such contract or lease
unless, at the time of assumption of such contract or lease, the
trustee
(A) cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will
promptly cure, such default;
(B) compensates, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee
will promptly compensate, a party other than the debtor to such
contract or lease, for any actual pecuniary loss to such party
resulting from such default; and
(C) provides adequate assurance of future performance under such
contract or lease.
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection does not apply to a default that is
a breach of a provision relating to(A) the insolvency or financial condition of the debtor at any time
before the closing of the case;
(B) the commencement of a case under this title;
(C) the appointment of or taking possession by a trustee in a case
under this title or a custodian before such commencement; or
(D) the satisfaction of any penalty rate or provision relating to a
default arising from any failure by the debtor to perform
nonmonetary obligations under the executory contract or
unexpired lease.
(3) For the purpose of paragraph (1) of this subsection and paragraph
(2)(B) of subsection (f), adequate assurance of future performance of a
lease of real property in a shopping center includes adequate
assurance(A) of the source of rent and other consideration due under such
lease, and in the case of an assignment, that the financial
condition and operating performance of the proposed assignee and
its guarantors, if any, shall be similar to the financial condition
and operating performance of the debtor and its guarantors, if
any, as of the time the debtor became the lessee under the lease;
(B) that any percentage rent due under such lease will not decline
substantially;
(C) that assumption or assignment of such lease is subject to all
the provisions thereof, including (but not limited to) provisions
such as a radius, location, use, or exclusivity provision, and will
not breach any such provision contained in any other lease,
financing agreement, or master agreement relating to such
shopping center; and
(D) that assumption or assignment of such lease will not disrupt
any tenant mix or balance in such shopping center.
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, if there has
been a default in an unexpired lease of the debtor, other than a
default of a kind specified in paragraph (2) of this subsection, the
trustee may not require a lessor to provide services or supplies
incidental to such lease before assumption of such lease unless the
lessor is compensated under the terms of such lease for any services
and supplies provided under such lease before assumption of such
lease.
(c) The trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or
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that in order to assign a lease, the tenant would first have to
assume the lease. 179 If a lease were in default, the tenant would
have to cure the default and provide "adequate assurance of future
performance" in order to assume the lease. 80° In addition, if the

unexpired lease of the debtor, whether or not such contract or lease
prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if

(1)

(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such
contract or lease from accepting performance from or rendering
performance to an entity other than the debtor or the debtor in
possession, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or
restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties; and
(B) such party does not consent to such assumption or assignment;
or
(2) such contract is a contract to make a loan, or extend other debt
financing or financial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the
debtor, or to issue a security of the debtor;
(3) such lease is of nonresidential real property and has been
terminated under applicable nonbankruptcy law prior to the order for
relief; or
(4) such lease is of nonresidential real property under which the
debtor is the lessee of an aircraft terminal or aircraft gate at an
airport at which the debtor is the lessee under one or more additional
nonresidential leases of an aircraft terminal or aircraft gate and the
trustee, in connection with such assumption or assignment, does not
assume all such leases or does not assume and assign all of such
leases to the same person, except that the trustee may assume or
assign less than all of such leases with the airport operator's written
consent.

(f)
(1)
Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section,
notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or unexpired
lease of the debtor, or in applicable law, that prohibits, restricts, or
conditions the assignment of such contract of lease, the trustee may
assign such contract or lease under paragraph (2) of this subsection.
(2) The trustee may assign an executory contract or unexpired lease
of the debtor only if
(A) the trustee assumes such contract or lease in accordance with
the provisions of this section; and
(B) adequate assurance of future performance by the assignee of
such contract or lease is provided, whether or not there has been a
default in such contract or lease.
(3) Notwithstanding a provision in an executory contract or
unexpired lease of the debtor, or in applicable law that terminates or
modifies, or permits a party other than the debtor to terminate or
modify, such contract or lease or a right or obligation under such
contract or lease on account of an assignment of such contract or
lease, such contract, lease, right, or obligation may not be terminated
or modified under such provision because of the assumption or
assignment of such contract or lease by the trustee.
179. 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(2)(A).
180. Id. §§ 365(b)(1)(A), (C), 365(f).
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lease is assumed and the tenant wishes to assign, the tenant must
provide adequate assurance of future performance by the assignee,
181
whether or not the lease is in default.
There is no general definition of "adequate assurance of
future performance" in the Code. However, as a result of the
efforts of the ICSC, there is a special definition applicable to leases
in shopping centers, 182 under which assurance must be given as to
the rent and percentage rent, and that assumption and
assignment will not breach restrictive covenants governing radius,
use or exclusivity or disrupt the tenant mix or balance in the
shopping center. 83 Because of concern that the provisions as
originally enacted may not have accomplished the objective
effectively, Congress made a number of changes in 1984 with
respect to tenant bankruptcies in shopping centers. 8 4
The
principal one, from the standpoint of the hypothetical situation
here discussed, is a requirement that in the case of an assignment
of a lease in a shopping center, adequate assurance had to be given
that "the financial condition and operating performance of the
proposed assignee and its guarantors, if any, shall be similar to
the financial condition and operating performance of the debtor
and its guarantors, if any, as of the time the debtor became the
185
lessee under the lease."
If a tenant in bankruptcy can simply avoid these
requirements by "selling" the lease under § 363, the entire
structure of protection for the landlord on the tenant's bankruptcy
would fall.
Because this possibility was so intriguing (which may be an
inappropriate word, given the potential damage it could do), we
inserted a hypothetical situation as one of the issues to be argued
in the Twelfth Annual Chief Judge Conrad B. Duberstein National
Bankruptcy Moot Court Competition in March of 2004.186 Grading
181. Id. § 365(f)(2)(B).
182. Id. § 365(b)(3).
183. Id. As originally enacted the requirement was that there was no
"substantial" breach of those covenants, leaving a great deal to the discretion
of the courts.
184. Other shopping center amendments are discussed in Battershall, supra
note 177.
185. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(3)(A). It was enacted as part of the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 362(a),
98 Stat. 333 (codified as amended in various sections of Titles 11 and 28 of the
U.S. Code).
186. The Chief Judge Conrad B. Duberstein National Bankruptcy Moot
Court Competition is sponsored by the American Bankruptcy Institute and St.
John's University School of Law and is the only national competition devoted
to bankruptcy law in the nation. The questions argued are generally major
contentious issues then before the courts and Congress or soon to become
certiorari issues before the Supreme Court. Since bankruptcy and real estate
transactions seem inextricably related, the competition issues often involve
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in a moot court competition is based exclusively on how the
students present the argument and deal with questions. The
judges do not decide the issue or state which substantive result
would be correct. However, in discussing the issues after the
arguments with the bankruptcy professionals who served as
judges in the preliminary rounds, I perceived a consensus on this
substantive issue that, notwithstanding Qualitech, the specific
provisions of § 365 should trump the more general § 363 when a
debtor/tenant is seeking to sell the lease. Also, while I may have
87
misjudged completely the minds of the judges in the semi-final
and final 8 8 rounds, from the content of the questions they asked
(always a risky thing to do as many followers of U.S. Supreme
Court arguments will agree), I also concluded that if a decision
were to have been rendered, there was a good chance it would
have favored § 365 over § 363 when the tenant is in bankruptcy.
Perhaps my perception was influenced by the fact that I personally
believed that courts would not apply the Qualitech reasoning in
the tenant's bankruptcy. However, after studying the issue in
greater detail, I no longer feel confident that leasehold investors
will feel confident that courts would not permit a tenant to sell its
lease under § 363 rather than assign under § 365.
Not only did I find the statutory language disturbingly clear
even when applied to a tenant's bankruptcy, but also there are
some distinct reasons that make it conceivable courts could find
the two provisions enforceable. The following discussion will
review why this may be so, consider to what extent the severe
consequences of a sale of the lease under § 363 can be drafted
around from both a theoretical as well as practical standpoint, and

real estate transactions. For example, the first competition in 1993 dealt with
the new value "exception" to the absolute priority rule and innovative
classification of claims in single-asset real estate cases. Other real estate
issues included the strip-down of mortgages in Chapter 13 after the Nobelman
decision (Nobelman v. Am. Sav. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993)), lease
terminations as fraudulent transfers following the BFP Supreme Court
decision (BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994)), and
abandonment of contaminated property and clean-up costs as administrative
expenses. In the twelfth competition on March 6-8, 2004, thirty-six teams
participated from around the nation.
187. Judges for the semi-final round were: Hon. Philip Brandt (Bankr. W.D.
Wash.), Hon. Melanie Cyganowski (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.), Hon. Robert Drain
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), Hon. Nancy Dreher (Bankr. D. Min.), Hon. Dororthy
Eisenberg (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.), Hon. Robert E. Gerber (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), Hon.
Steven D. Gerling (Ch. J. Bankr. N.D.N.Y.), Hon. Arthur J. Gonzalez (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y.), Hon. Berton R. Lifland (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), Hon. Raymond T. Lyons
(Bankr. D.N.J.), and Hon. Thomas Waldron (Bankr. N.D. Ohio).
188. Judges for the final round were: Hon. Edith Hollan Jones (5th Cir.),
Hon Richard A. Posner (7th Cir.), Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, (2d Cir.), Hon.
Stuart M. Bernstein (Ch. J. Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), and Hon. Conrad B. Duberstein
(Ch. J. Bankr. E.D.N.Y.)
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attempt to determine how this drafting may affect leasehold
investments. It will conclude with a suggestion for amendment to
the Bankruptcy Code to avoid the problem by preserving the
conditions to assignment set forth in § 365.
C. The Statutory Language
The statutory language is very clear. As discussed above in
connection with the Qualitech decision, 8 9 the Bankruptcy Code,
and especially the sections in question, is replete with crossreferences. There is nothing in the statute or the legislative
history that would lead one to believe that the failure to make
§ 363 subject to § 365 was merely a scrivener's error 90 that could
be corrected by the courts. 191
Nevertheless, it is important to note that, unlike the
Qualitech situation, we may be dealing with two sections that
produce different results under the same circumstances.
In
Qualitech, the Seventh Circuit held that the landlord had a choice
of retaining ownership and rejecting the lease, or selling its fee
interest free and clear of the lease. The court noted that these
were two distinct circumstances. That is not so when the tenant is
in bankruptcy and sells the lease under § 363 rather than
assigning the lease under § 365. It is clear that the apples and
oranges analogy doesn't work here. Sales and assignments of
leases are the same thing192 notwithstanding the fact that § 363
speaks of sales of property and § 361 deals with assignments.
When we refer to transfers of leasehold interests and executory
contracts, it is customary to refer to the transfer as an assignment
189. See discussion supra in Part II.C.
190. Cf. Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S.
151, 163 (1991).
191. The House Report accompanying House Bill 8200 (an earlier version of,
but quite similar in it's approach to what was eventually enacted) states with
respect to § 363:
This section defines the rights and powers of the trustee with respect to
the use, sale or lease of property and the rights of other parties that
have interests in the property involved... Subsection (b) permits the
trustee to use, sell, or lease, other than in the ordinary course of
business, property of the estate. The trustee must give notice of any
use, sale, or lease under this subsection, and provide an opportunity for
objections and a hearing if there are any objections.
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 344-45. This language seems to cover any property of
the estate without exception.
192. For real estate mavens, it seems hardly necessary to prove this point.
For doubters, however, see Cinicola v. Scharffenberger,248 F.3d 110, 124 (3d
Cir. 2001), which states that a sale and an assignment are the same, and
Comco Associates, v. FaraldiFood Indus., Ltd., 170 B.R. 765, 769 n.9 (E.D.N.Y
1994), where the court stated "assignments are in fact just a type of sale.
Instead of purchasing or leasing property, transactions governed by § 363, an
assignee purchases a lease. A good faith assignee, therefore, stands in the
same shoes as a good faith purchaser .... "

20041

The Sad History of § 365(h) of the Bankruptcy Code

and § 365 employs that term. However, while all sales of leases
are assignments, not all assignments of leases are sales. A sale is
a transfer for consideration but an assignment may be made with
or without consideration (such as by gift). Since § 363 only deals
with transfers for consideration of any estate assets, it
appropriately employs the word "sell" even to assignments of
leases. Whichever terminology is used, there is no question that a
sale of a lease is an assignment.
Thus it can be strongly argued that the Qualitech court would
not have applied the same reasoning to the tenant's attempt to sell
the lease as it did to the landlord's attempt to sell the fee. Clearly
there is greater potential for conflict between the two sections
when the tenant is in bankruptcy than when the landlord is the
debtor. If the sections are in conflict, then the canon of
construction providing that the more specific provision prevails
over the more general provision, assumes greater importance.
Notwithstanding this, it is questionable whether that canon
should apply in the situation here discussed. Canons are designed
to carry out a presumed intent of the legislature. In this situation,
there may be evidence of congressional intent that trumps the
canon. If there is a legitimate reason that can be attributed to
Congress enacting two provisions that deal differently with the
same circumstances, then there is a basis for the courts allowing
both provisions to apply. Keep in mind yet another canon-if
possible, the courts should give effect to the meaning of both
sections.193
We are dealing with two sections of the same statute, located
in close proximity to each other, part of a complex of sections
dealing with Case Administration in general, and Administrative
Powers in particular. The sections were enacted together in 1978
when the Bankruptcy Code was first adopted. While there have
been amendments to both provisions since the first enactment, the
basic core provisions are the same. Careful consideration was
given to both provisions over many years. Is there a legitimate
reason that can provide rationality for the two provisions covering
the same thing? Can the provisions be reconciled in a way that
would indicate that Congress may have so intended?
1.

The Role of the Courts
Section 363 provides in subsection (b)(1) that the trustee,

193. See, e.g., 3A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION § 70.4 (6th ed. 2003) ("Statutes that relate to the same subject
matter are in pari materia and should be construed together in order to
produce a harmonious statutory scheme. If two acts of a legislature are
applicable to the same subject, their provisions are to be reconciled if this can
be done by fair and reasonable intendment .. " (citing Chrysler Credit Corp.
v. Burton, 599 F. Supp 1313, 1317 (M.D.N.C. 1984)).
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after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease property of the
estate other than in the ordinary course of business. What is
important about this language is that such a sale may not
normally take place unless the court holds a hearing giving the
parties with interests in the property sold the opportunity to
present arguments. Section 365(f) gives the tenant the right to
assign a lease provided the conditions for assignment set forth are
met. The tenant wishing to assign is required under § 365 first to
assume the lease "with the court's approval,"'194 and the Rules
appear to assume that the order approving the assumption will
approve the assignment. 195 Thus the courts have a great deal of
discretion in permitting both sale and assignment.
This helps support an argument that Congress may have
intended the two provisions to be interpreted as written. Section
365 contains numerous protective provisions for the landlord. If
the tenant cannot comply with all of those provisions the tenant
may request sale under § 363, at which point a hearing will be
held. At the hearing the tenant will explain the importance of the
sale is to the estate. A failure to sell might be fatal to the debtor's
reorganization, and might adversely affect the ability of creditors
to realize on their claims. On the other hand, the landlord will
explain to the court how damaging the assignment would be for
the shopping center. The court would have the authority to weigh
the benefit to the estate of permitting the sale against the damage
such sale would cause the landlord. 196
Thus it is possible that a court might find, however
incorrectly, that it was the intention of Congress to allow the
courts to make the decision on the sale of leases in lieu of an
assignment after weighing the equities on both sides. Assigning
such determinations to the court is not unusual in the Bankruptcy
Code.
For example, consider § 363(h) where the debtor is
permitted to sell property free of interests of a co-owner in certain
circumstances including where the court determines that "the

194. 11 U.S.C. § 365(f)(2).
195. FED. R. BANKR. P. 6006. Interestingly, an "assignment" of a lease will
normally be outside the ordinary course of business, and since an assignment
is a sale, § 363(b) would require not only court permission, but also a hearing.
196. For example, assume the debtor/tenant had many locations and the
proposed sale encompassed all the locations, with the purchaser willing to go
forward only if all the stores were included in the package. If the sale would
produce significant additional funds for the debtor's estate, the court might be
inclined to permit the sale, provided the consequence to the landlord would not
be disastrous. On the other hand, if the sale could go forward with the lease
withdrawn from the sale package, or if the proposed assignee would violate
restrictive provisions in other shopping center leases, the court might be
persuaded not to approve the sale. Some of these considerations were raised
by one of the Court of Appeals judges in the Duberstein Competition final
round argument.
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benefit to the estate of the sale of such property free of the
interests of co-owners outweighs the detriment, if any, to such coowners." Real estate developers and leasehold investors, however,
may not be willing to trust the future viability of their shopping
centers and investments to a court's weighing of how important a
sale is to a tenant.
2. Lease Prohibitionson Assignment
We have said that an argument supporting the priority of
§ 365 over § 363 when the tenant is in bankruptcy might be that if
§ 365 did not prevail, a tenant could effectively abrogate the
carefully drafted preconditions to assignment built into § 365, thus
rendering them meaningless. However, that argument assumes,
without complete justification, that the two provisions really are in
conflict. We have already addressed the fact that the court,
required to hold a hearing before permitting the sale of assets
outside the ordinary course of business, may where the
circumstances justify, refuse to permit the sale and throw the
tenant back to § 365, thus leaving significant life in that section
even if § 363 is interpreted as written. But there is more.
While it is true that § 365 contains significant preconditions
to assignment by the tenant, it also facilitates the ability of the
tenant to assign in the face of a provision in the lease prohibiting
assignment.1 97 While § 363 permits sale notwithstanding the preconditions to assignment found in § 365, it contains no provision
permitting sale notwithstanding a provision in the lease that
restricts assignment or transfer of the lease, other than a
provision based on the insolvency or financial condition of the
debtor.198 Thus, if the lease contains a provision that prevents
assignment, it would appear to have the effect of prohibiting sale
under § 363.199 In other words, an effective anti-assignment
197. Section 365(f) provides in part that, subject to some exceptions found in
§ 365(c), the trustee may assign an executory contract or unexpired lease of
the debtor "notwithstanding a provision.., that prohibits, restricts, or
conditions the assignment of such contract or lease."
198. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(/) and supra text accompanying note 94.
199. This conclusion is based on the language of the statute, which permits
sale free and clear of an interest only under § 363(f). Thus under § 363(b), the
property would be sold as is, with all its warts, subject to all rights and
interests of third parties, which should include preconditions to sale. An
argument can be made that § 363 permits sale of the property of the estate
and the lease is property of the estate. Therefore the permission to sell
overcomes the language of the anti-assignment provision. Such an argument
should not prevail. From the standpoint of the language of the statute, it was
felt necessary in § 365 to insert specific provisions permitting assignment
notwithstanding anti-assignment language in the lease. The absence of such a
provision in § 363 would indicate that anti-assignment provisions were not
intended to be overcome by a sale. Indeed § 363(l) abrogates certain antiassignment provisions but limits that abrogation to those prohibiting sale
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provision would prevent sale under § 363(b), but the tenant could
nevertheless assign under § 365 by meeting that section's
preconditions to assignment.
Thus, in the hypothetical situation set forth above, with an
effective anti-assignment provision, the tenant not only couldn't
sell under § 363(b), but, because the proposed assignee does not
meet the preconditions to assignment, it also could not assign
under § 365. On the other hand, if there were no effective antiassignment provision in the lease, the tenant in our hypothetical
could sell the lease under § 363 without meeting the preconditions
to assignment under § 365, provided the court, after notice and a
hearing, approves. If these conclusions are correct, it is possible
for a court to find that the provisions of the two sections can both
be enforced. A landlord could then protect the lease against sale
under § 363 by negotiating a strict anti-assignment clause in the
lease. But will such negotiations always be successful?
The foregoing assumes that anti-assignment provisions are
easily placed in leases.
When anti-assignment clauses are
negotiated in the commercial 20 0 real estate world (as distinguished
from the less than real bankruptcy world), a compromise must
often be worked out between the landlord's interest in controlling
who will occupy the premises and the tenant's interest in
achieving flexibility of operation.
These compromises run the gamut from a provision requiring
landlord's consent for an assignment, but providing that the
landlord's consent will not be withheld unreasonably, to provisions
specifically authorizing the tenant to assign to certain classes of
assignees or to assignees with certain financial standing. Even
where a commercial lease contains an absolute anti-assignment
clause, some courts have interpreted the clause to permit the
landlord to withhold consent only if the landlord demonstrates
that it has a commercially reasonable objection to the
assignment. 2 1 The Restatement of Property takes a middle
course-the landlord's consent may not be withheld unreasonably
"unless a freely negotiated provision in the lease gives
the landlord
(also use and leasing) based on the insolvency or financial condition of the
debtor or the bankruptcy filing. In addition, from a purely conceptual
standpoint, only property rights the debtor has can go into the debtor's estate.
If the debtor owns property that legally cannot be sold, it would only be that
state of title that could enter the estate.
200. We are dealing here with commercial leases.
With respect to
residential leases an entirely different set of considerations arise while the
consequences of a sale free and clear would generally be far less onerous for
the landlord.
Indeed the language of the agreement with respect to
assignments may be trumped by case or statutory decisions to the contrary in
residential situations. See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAw § 226-b(3) (McKinney
2000).
201. See, e.g., Kendall v. Ernest Pestana, Inc., 709 P.2d 837, 842 (Cal. 1985).
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20 2
The result then, at least
an absolute right to withhold consent."
in those jurisdictions that do not impose a reasonableness
standard regardless of the lease language, is that the landlord
would have to negotiate a provision giving the landlord the
absolute right to withhold consent in order to protect the lease
from sale under the Bankruptcy Code.
If the anti-assignment provision were subject to a
reasonableness standard, the decision as to the lender's
reasonableness presumably would be left, in our hypothetical
situation, in the hands of the bankruptcy judge, a situation that
20 3
Obviously, where there
would be anathema to many landlords.
is anything like equal bargaining positions between the landlord
and a prospective tenant, the landlord may not be able to obtain
If the
an absolute enforceable anti-assignment provision.
protection,
bankruptcy
primarily
is
concern
landlord's
20 4
compromises might become difficult and deals may be lost.

3. Can the Lease Be Sold Free and Clearof an Anti-Assignment
Provision?
We have thus far concluded that if the landlord can secure an
effective anti-assignment provision, it would seem that a sale of
the lease may be prevented under § 363(b) because sales outside
20 5
the ordinary course of business are normally subject to all rights
and interests of third parties. If the landlord is able to obtain an
effective anti-assignment provision, is the right to restrict
assignments a landlord's interest in the lease, and, if so, can the
lease be sold under our old friend § 363(f) free and clear of that

202. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD AND TENANT
(1977).

§

15.2(2)

203. If the court were in a position to determine what is "reasonable" in the
commercial leasing field, the howls would be heard far and wide. Suppose the

landlord did not deal with an entity, not because of its financial strength, but
because of prior sour relationships, or because the entity was suspected of
unscrupulous dealings, or ties to organized crime. In that situation, both a
conservative institutional landlord or a flamboyant real estate developer
would recoil at giving the authority to determine whether the rejection is
reasonable to the bankruptcy court they may perceive as anxious to see the
reorganization succeed.
204. This, of course, is not the first instance where business deals must be
modified to accommodate bankruptcy risks. For example, a great impetus was
given to restricting junior financing through the insertion of due on
encumbrance provisions in mortgages because the lender might be precluded
by the automatic stay of § 362(a)(1),(3) or (4) from cutting off a junior
mortgage in the foreclosure proceeding if the junior were in bankruptcy. The
Second Circuit has held (amazingly) that the lender is not a party in interest
in the bankruptcy of the junior interest and therefore did not have standing
even to ask for relief from stay. See In re Comcoach Corp., 698 F.2d 571, 573
(2d Cir. 1983).
205. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(g), (h).
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right 20 6 a la Qualitech?207

The answer involves numerous questions that can easily be
raised herein, but given the scope of this Article, not easily
resolved. The purpose of reviewing these issues is to illustrate the
state of uncertainty created by the Qualitech decision and the need
for statutory clarification.
a. Is a Restriction on Assignment an Interest in the Lease?
Section 363(f) permits sale free and clear of interests in
property. Thus the starting point is to determine whether the
landlord's rights under an effective anti-assignment provision
constitute an interest by the landlord in the lease. What is an
interest subject to being divested under § 363 is a current hot
topic. Professor Kuney, in his two recent articles, 20 8 is perplexed
by the seeming contradiction in current decisions. He notes the
recent cases finding that property may be sold free and clear of
successor liability for claims (not normal in rem interests) on the
ground that such liability, arising out of the property sold,
represents an interest in that property. 209 Those cases, he argues,
ignore the distinction between permitted sales in plan
confirmation under §§ 1123(a)(5)(D) and 1141(c) free and clear of
"claims or interests" and permitted sales under
§ 363(f) free and
clear of "interests."210

In his second article, he compares those

decisions with the decisions of courts that do not permit § 363(f)
sales free and clear of certain in rem interests such as deed
restrictions and covenants, 2 11 either on the basis that they are not

206. By this it is meant that the sale free and clear of the anti-assignment
clause means that the lease may be sold notwithstanding the anti-assignment
provision. Also, it may mean that the purchaser of the lease would be able to
acquire the lease without restriction on future assignment.
207. There is a seeming anomaly in the argument that if the antiassignment provision constitutes an interest in the lease, the lease can be sold
free and clear of that interest, but if the landlord's rights do not rise to the
level of an interest, the landlord's rights will be preserved.
208. George W. Kuney, MisinterpretingBankruptcy Code Section 363(t) and
Undermining the Chapter 11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235 (2002); Kuney,
supra note 139.
209. See, e.g., UMWA 1992 Benefit Plan v. Leckie Smokeless Coal Co. (In re
Leckie Smokeless Coal Co.), 99 F.3d 573 (4th Cir. 1996) (permitting sale free
and clear of successor liability claims arising under Coal Act); In re Trans
World Airlines, Inc. 322 F.3d 283 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding that § 363(f) could
extinguish successor liability for certain employee claims). The court's theory
for finding that successor liability claims were interests was on the ground
that any rights that arise from the property being sold were interests. Id. at
290.
210. Kuney, supra note 139.
Professor Kuney points out that this
interpretation of § 363(f) has led to avoiding the confirmation standards and
process through sales of businesses under § 363(f) where there is a very
limited right of appeal. Id. See also 11 U.S.C. § 363(m).
211. "[T]he courts have limited the 'interests' that § 363(f) can strip off to
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"interests," or even if they are interests, that the prerequisites
212
Both Professors Kuney and
under § 363(f) can not be met.
213
are interests in property
covenants
argue that those
Mattingly
in almost every case, the
that,
and
to which § 363(f) should apply,
permitted under one or
be
can
sale free and clear of those interests
§ 363(f).214
under
sale
such
to
more of the prerequisites
is covered by § 363(f)
what
that
see
we
From this commentary
types of claims that
certain
to
may be expanding when it comes
and contracting,
section,
the
by
are considered interests covered
interests that
rem
in
traditional
when it comes to some rather
a right
Where
§
363(f).
of
perils
the
to
should perhaps be subject
clear.
not
is
confusion
seeming
this
in
to prevent assignment falls
leasehold
the
both
concern
and
touch
Such a right would appear to
and the fee interest since it controls the orderly development of the
shopping center. Thus the restriction should run with the land to
215
Clearly the right to prevent
a purchaser of the fee interest.
being sold in the sense
property
the
assignment arises from
21 6
recent Third Circuit
the
TWA,
as
cases
employed in such
any right that would
that
emphasized
court
decision in which the
is an interest in the
sold
being
property
the
of
not exist outside
such as In re
cases
are
there
hand,
other
the
property. On
217
first refusal
of
right
a
that
held
court
the
Fleishman, where
for a
covenants
restrictive
of
declaration
a
of
recorded as part
executory
an
was
but
land,
the
with
run
not
development did
contract that could be severed from the other restrictions and
rejected under § 365.
The one conclusion that is incontrovertible is that it is unclear
whether the anti-assignment provision is a landlord's interest in

exclude traditional in rem interests that run with the land without any

overarching unified theory or legislative guidance for support." Kuney, supra

note 139, at 295.
212. See, e.g., Gouvenia v. Tazbir, 37 F.3d 295 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that a
sale could not be free and clear of restrictive covenant); In re 523 E. Fifth St.
Hous. Preservation Dev. Fund Corp., 79 B.R. 568, 571 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(holding, inter alia, that sale did not meet preconditions of § 363(f) for
extinguishment of restrictive covenant); Silverman v. Ankari (In re Oyster Bay
Cove Ltd.), 196 B.R. 251 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding § 363(f) not intended to sever
easements and non-monetary property interests under state law and proposed
sale cannot meet prerequisites).
213. See Mattingly, supra note 126.
214. See discussion supra Part II.D.1.
215. It is not clear that it would run with the land to an assignee of the
tenant. Under the Rule in Dumpor's Case, 4 Coke 119b, 76 Eng. Rep. 1110
(K.B. 1578), which still plagues landlord-tenant law, once the landlord gives
consent to an assignment, prohibitions against assignment would be
considered waived for the future unless the landlord protects itself with a
provision in the lease to the contrary.
216. In re Trans World Airlines, 322 F.3d at 290.
217. In re Fleishman, 138 B.R. 641, 645 (Bankr. E.D. Mass. 1992).

The John MarshallLaw Review

[38:97

the lease for the purposes of § 363(0. If so, it could be possible
that a landlord, having succeeded in negotiating an effective antiassignment provision, may still see the lease assigned in
bankruptcy free and clear of that interest.
b.

Is § 363(b) a Bar to Sale Free and Clear?
Section 363(f) provides for sale "under subsection (b) or (c) of
this section" free and clear of an interest. 218 Subsection (c) deals
with transactions in the ordinary course of the debtor's business
and is not relevant to the sales we are dealing with. 219 For our
purposes, then, the language of § 363(0 allows sales of property
authorized by § 363(b) to be free and clear of interests. As
discussed above, if there is an effective anti-assignment provision
in a lease, it would seem that the lease should not be subject to
sale under § 363(b). If that is true, it would follow that the
property cannot be sold free and clear of the anti-assignment
provision under § 363(o.
The argument to the contrary might be that nothing in the
nature of a lease would prevent its sale under § 363(b). Thus, the
agreement not to assign, if an interest in the lease, can be cut off if
one of the § 363(f) prerequisites were met. The Fleishman case,
discussed above, 220 appears to recognize this.
There the
Association had argued that the property could not be sold free of
the right of first refusal under § 363(f) because the debtor could
not meet any one of the five prerequisites. Judge Goodman
seemingly recognized that if a prerequisite had been met, a sale
under § 363(f) free and clear of the right of first refusal could have
taken place even though the right of first refusal would have
otherwise prevented the sale under § 363. He held, however, that
there was no need to meet the requirements of § 363(f) because the
obligation was personal and could be disaffirmed as an executory
contract.
c.

Can the § 363(0 Requirements Be Met?
We have now come full circle and are back to the discussion
earlier as to the prerequisites to sale under § 363(f). Even if the
anti-assignment provision represents an interest of the landlord in
the lease, and sale would not be barred by subparagraph (b) of
§ 363, it would still be necessary to meet one of the § 363
prerequisites. Generally, the same considerations discussed in
connection with the landlord's bankruptcy apply. As with the
previous discussion, subsection (f)(1) (property may be sold free
and clear under nonbankruptcy law) and subsection (f)(3) (deals
218.

11 U.S.C. § 363(o).

219. Id. § 363(c).
220. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
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only with liens) will not be met. Subsection (f)(2) (consent) would
require the landlord to consent to the sale free and clear of its
interest, which is much less likely to happen in this context and is
not of direct concern to a leasehold mortgagee. Subsection (f)(4)
(bona fide dispute) could apply in a jurisdiction that limits the
ability of a landlord to negotiate and enforce an absolute antiassignment provision by case law or statute. However, if the right
is unenforceable outside of bankruptcy, a landlord should not
expect it to be enforceable in bankruptcy. This leaves § 363(f)(5)
(compelling money satisfaction) where the issue of whether the
hypothetical application of the provision will allow global rights
involving bankruptcy, eminent domain, and foreclosure rights to
prevail. If, for example, condemnation proceedings against the
lease are a sufficient basis for permitting sale free and clear of the
landlord's right to prohibit assignment, the landlord would be
compelled to take a money satisfaction of that interest in a
hypothetical condemnation proceeding.
COMMENT: Notwithstanding the discussion above
concerning the potential of selling free and clear of an antiassignment provision under § 363(f), it makes sense, at least in
those jurisdictions that will enforce such provisions as written, for
landlords and shopping center developers to insist on an antiassignment provision in the lease under which no assignment will
be permitted without the prior written consent of the landlord, and
providing further that such consent may be withheld for any reason
or no reason. In addition, the tenant should affirm that the
provision has been freely negotiated and that the tenant
understands and freely accepts the meaning of the provision.
PRACTICE

d. What Adequate Protection Would Be Available to the
Landlord?
Here again we would be faced with the problems discussed in
Section II.D.2. of this Article-with some exceptions. First, the
landlord would probably be in a position to request adequate
protection based on the landlord's interest in the lease.
Presumably an argument might be made that the landlord has no
interest in the lease because a lease is a conveyance and the
landlord has only a reversion after the lease term. This would
overlook the fact that a lease is also a contract with many
covenants and conditions that would represent an interest in the
leasehold estate. Thus the landlord should be in a position to
request adequate protection.
The real problem may be in the determination of what
damage a sale of the lease in violation of covenants in the lease
will cause the landlord, for the purpose of determining what
Assume the hypothetical situation
protection is "adequate."
discussed in Section III.A. above and that the lease contains
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covenants and is subject to reciprocal easement agreements that
would prevent the tenant from assigning the lease to the proposed
purchaser. If the sale is permitted, what is the loss to the
landlord? For example, if the sale violates restrictive covenants,
will that cause a beneficiary of those covenants to declare a default
and take advantage of any right to terminate? Or will the tenant
be restricted to money damages and what will that amount to?
Will the discount operation result in a decrease in the profitability
of the shopping center, and if so, by how much? These are all
unknowns. What will be considered to be adequate protection by
the court will not be foreseeable. As a result, there is potential for
a serious and adverse impact on shopping centers and other real
estate investments.
D. Is the Ripple Effect on Tenant's Bankruptcy Really a Problem?
This part of this Article, dealing with tenant's bankruptcy,
was written to illustrate the unanswered questions left to us by
the Qualitech decision, not to answer them. At the outset, it may
be that courts will not follow Qualitech down the path to sales of
leases in the tenant's bankruptcy.
Clearly there are strong
arguments that even the Seventh Circuit in this situation, unlike
the landlord's bankruptcy situation, would have decided
differently based on a conclusion that a sale and assignment of a
lease are the same. If, however, a court should apply the
Qualitech conclusion that §§ 363 and 365 can live together, then
the issues and consequences of such a conclusion can be
staggering.
Thus, the purpose of this section is to illustrate the Pandorian
nature of the Qualitech holding and to further bolster the need for
corrective legislation. Obviously there are many issues involved in
the tenant's bankruptcy situation that need further exploration.
However, from this review of just some of the problems involved, it
is clear that statutory amendment is the one sure method to make
it clear that the tenant in bankruptcy cannot, by employing § 363,
avoid the carefully drawn protection and balance built into § 365.
IV.

CONCLUSION

It would seem as though this Article has raised many more
questions than answers. However, there are some conclusions that
may be reached:
1. Notwithstanding the fact that the Qualitech holding was
never contemplated by the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code, the
holding seems at least technically correct and may be followed by
other courts.
2. There is a good chance that the sale of a fee interest free
and clear of a lease in the landlord's bankruptcy can meet one or
more of the prerequisites to sale free and clear under § 363(f),
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especially subsections (f)(2) and (5).
3. If a sale free and clear of the lease is permitted, the lack of
credit bidding makes it unclear whether the tenant will be fully
compensated through adequate protection.
4. From the standpoint of the leasehold mortgagee, unless
the fee interest is encumbered by the lien of the leasehold
mortgage, adequate protection may not be available except
derivatively through the tenant under circumstances where it may
be impossible to make certain that the tenant will request
adequate protection.
5. The ripple effect of the Qualitech holding could result in
sales of leases in the tenant's bankruptcy under § 363 when they
could not be sold under § 365. If that is the case, it is unclear
whether the landlord will be able to obtain adequate protection for
its interest.
6. Given the fact that leasehold investment is tied closely to
the availability of leasehold mortgages, and the fact that leasehold
mortgagees rely on the continued existence of the lease, the ever
fragile leasehold investment field can be upset by cases that
permit the defeasance of the lease or the diminution in the value
of ownership.
7. This exploration, as a result of the Qualitech decision, has
revealed numerous problems under § 363 that are sorely in need of
correction.
This Article concludes with an appeal for that corrective
legislation. The attached Appendix contains a revision of § 363
together with commentary and explanations as to each change
proposed. The amendments are proposed as a starting point for
development of a consensus on what legislation is needed.
Before another crisis occurs in leasehold investments, it is
urged that real estate people from all parts of the spectrum join
together to correct what is, at best, an ambiguous and dangerous
situation.
APPENDIX
This Appendix contains suggested amendments to portions of
§ 363 of the Bankruptcy Code to deal with problems raised in this
Article. They are presented as a starting point in the drafting
process. It is hoped that this proposed language will ferret out
problems and lead to precise language that will not be subject to
the fate of amendments to § 365 discussed in the Article.
The proposed amendments are shown in legislative format,
that is, additions are underlined and deletions are shown in
brackets. Following each of the subsections is a short Comment
explaining the purpose of the proposed changes.
§ 363. Use, sale, or lease of property
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(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, at any
time, on request of an entity that has an interest in property
used, sold, or leased, or proposed to be used, sold, or leased, by
the trustee, the court, with or without a hearing, shall prohibit or
condition such use, sale, or lease as is necessary to provide
adequate protection of such interest. This subsection also applies
to property that is subject to any unexpired lease of personal
property (to the exclusion of such property being subject to an
order to grant relief from the stay under section 362). As used in
this subsection, an entity that has an interest in property used,
sold, or leased, or Proposed to be used, sold or leased, includes a
leasehold mortgagee, sublessee or other entity with an interest in
such entity's interest.
COMMENT: This change is designed to insure that, in addition to the
tenant, a leasehold mortgagee or subtenant would be entitled to
adequate protection. While the Article is directed toward protection
for the leasehold mortgagee, the provision should equally protect the
rights of a subtenant, a holder of an easement or other holder of an
interest in the property.
(f) The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) or (c) of
this section free and clear of any interest in such property of an
entity other than the estate, only if(1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such
property by the debtor free and clear of such interest;
COMMENT: The addition is designed to prevent the sale of property
free and clear of a lease by limiting the application of the first
prerequisite to situation where the entity with the power to sell free
and clear of an interest is the debtor. Thus the potential foreclosure
of a prior interest in the fee would not be the basis for a sale free
and clear of the lease. While the failure to record the lease or
otherwise perfect the interest being sold would meet the
requirements of the subsection as amended, the tenant, subtenant,
or leasehold mortgagee would have the means to insure that such
recording take place.
(2) such entity and any entity holding a leasehold mortgage,
sublease or other interest in such entity's interest
consents....
COMMENT: This change would enable leasehold mortgagees,
sublessees, or other holders of interests to enforce non-consent
provisions in the documentation.
(4) the validity of such interest is in bona fide dispute; or
COMMENT: The addition of "the validity of' is designed to avoid an
argument that a dispute as to a matter arising out of the interest,
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rather than a dispute as to whether there is a valid interest, can be
the basis for invoking this prerequisite.
(5) such entity could be compelled by the debtor, in a legal or
equitable proceeding under nonbankruptcy law, to accept a
money satisfaction of such interest.
Subject to the foregoing, a court may order a property sold free
and clear of an interest in the property of an entity other than
the estate only at a fair upset price that will produce moneys
sufficient to compensate fully the holder of such interest after
paving prior administrative expenses chargeable to the sale
and other prior claims or interests.
COMMENT: The words "by the debtor" and "under nonbankruptcy
law" are designed to eliminate potential proceedings in eminent
domain, tax or judgment lien foreclosure, or bankruptcy as the basis
for a sale free and clear under this prerequisite.
The last sentence is added to insure that the purpose of permitting
sales free and clear under this prerequisite, as discussed in the
Article, is limited to situations where the proceeds are sufficient to
compensate the holder of the interest being cut off by the sale.
(k) Unless the court for cause orders otherwise [alt a sale under
subsection (b) of this section, an entity that has an interest in,or
a claim secured by a lien on the property proposed to be sold, [of
property that is subject to a lien that secures an allowed claim,
unless the court for cause orders otherwise] the holder of such
interest or claim may, bid at such sale, and, if such [the] holder
[of such claim] purchases such property, such holder may offset
such claim or the value of such interest against the purchase
price of such property[.] after payment of prior administrative
expenses chargeable to the sale and other prior claims or
interests. Prior to the sale, the court shall determine the value of
any interest in order to carry out the purpose of this subsection.

COMMENT: This change is designed to accomplish the following: (i)
permit the leasehold mortgagee or any other holder of a lien or
interest in the property being sold to credit bid at the sale; (ii)
provide that any offset is subject to the rights of prior claims or
interests; and (iii) provide a method of determining the value of an
interest for bidding and offsetting purposes.
Optional additional provision:
At the end of § 363(f) add a new paragraph as follows:
(g) Any sale of real property pursuant to subsection (f) shall be
subiect to the provisions of § 365 that govern the assumption,
assignment and rejection of leases.
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COMMENT: This paragraph is designed to eliminate the Qualitech
problem when the landlord in bankruptcy proposes to sell the
property free and clear of the lease or when a tenant in bankruptcy
proposes to sell or assign its lease under circumstances that would
not permit assignment under § 365. This would carry out the
intention of Congress when § 365 was drafted and amended over the
years. Adoption of this change might appear to obviate the need for
the other amendments proposed. However, the other amendments
are nevertheless recommended because (i) they would resolve
problems found in § 363 that would affect other interests in the
property and (ii) in the event that this provision is considered overly
broad, the other amendments should be sufficient protection to
permit leasehold investing to continue.

